Deriving consensus in multiagent systems  by Ephrati, Eithan & Rosenschein, Jeffrey S.
Artificial Intelligence 87 ( 1996) 21-74 
Artificial 
Intelligence 
Deriving consensus in multiagent systems 
Eithan Ephrati a* ’, Jeffrey S . Rosenschein b+* 
a AgentSof Ltd., PO. Box 53047, Jerusalem, Israel 
’ Institute of Computer Science, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel 
Received October 1993; revised December 1994 
Abstract 
Consider the designers of a multiagent environment, who are charged with establishing the rules 
by which agents in an encounter will interact. Once the rules of encounter have been determined, 
each builder of each agent is free to design his own machine any way that he wants. However, the 
rules that were established will certainly affect the choices he makes in building his own agent. 
In this article we suggest an economic decision process that can be used to derive multiagent 
consensus, namely, the Clarke tax mechanism (E.H. Clarke, 1971) . Consensus is reached through 
the process of voting; each agent expresses its preferences, and a group choice mechanism is 
used to select the result. Clarke tax-like mechanisms provide a set of attractive alternatives for the 
designers of multiagent environments, particularly if those environments consist of individually 
motivated heterogeneous agents. 
The Clarke tax mechanism has many desirable properties uch as non-manipulability, individual 
rationality, and maximization of the agents’ global utility. However, though theoretically attractive, 
the Clarke tax presents a number of difficulties when one attempts to use it in practical imple- 
mentations. This article examines how the Clarke tax could be used as an effective consensus 
mechanism in domains consisting of automated agents. In particular, we consider how agents 
can come to a consensus without needing to reveal full information about their preferences, and 
without needing to generate alternatives prior to the voting process. 
1. Introduction 
Multiagent systems have recently emerged as an important new focus for research 
in artificial intelligence (AI). The same factors that made distributed computer systems 
the norm, namely advances in miniaturization and networking technology, have had an 
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effect on the kinds of sophisticated autonomous systems that designers can build. When 
the domain has been suitable, designers have found compelling reasons to consider 
distributed AI solutions. Suitability of the domain might involve a natural geographic 
distribution in the sources of incoming data (so, for example, much research has focused 
on distributed systems of sensors carrying out cooperative data fusion [ 10, 13]), or a 
natural functional distribution best addressed through modular problem solvers (such as, 
for example, the modules at work in the Pilot’s Associate project [ 801). 
All this work on cooperative problem solvers arises as designers try to figure out the 
most effective way of dealing with difficult domains. Centralized solutions might be 
possible. but require a prohibitive amount of communication overhead, or require too 
much coordination from the diverse group of designers themselves. There are other kinds 
of problems, however, where distribution is not simply a tool to be used in designing 
a problem solving system-it is an innatc feature of the system itself. The Internet, for 
example, provides an extreme example of a real-world distributed environment. Systems 
of agents operating effectively in such an environment must cope appropriately with 
distribution. 
There has been a great deal of research in recent years on the common language 
that such heterogeneous computer systems can use to communicate with one another 
(efforts such as KIF, the knowledge interchange format, fall into this category [28] ). 
Our research assumes that this kind of common language already exists. The questions 
we ask revolve around how such a language will be used. Once agents share a language 
and are able to communicate, how will they choose to interact? 
Consider the designers of a multiagent environment, who are charged with establishing 
the rules by which agents in an encounter will interact. Once the rules of encounter have 
been determined, each builder of each agent is free to design his own machine any way 
that he wants. However, the rules that were established will certainly affect the choices 
he makes in building his own agent (these environment design issues are examined, for 
example, in [71]). 
This article is concerned with interaction mechanisms that can ensure that the agree- 
ments reached by individually motivated agents, and the process by which these agree- 
ments are reached, display certain desirable properties. The need for heterogeneous 
agents to reach agreement is increasingly a part of real-world distributed systems. The 
techniques we explore here provide tools for building environments capable of inducing 
beneficial coordination. 
1.1. Exurnples of upplicatiotts 
Consider the world’s current telecommunication network infrastructure. Various phys- 
ical pieces of this network are controlled by different companies and organizations. The 
management of these pieces is basically automated, and computers decide on the routing 
of messages and data between points. At times, messages may be more efficiently routed 
when resources (communication lines, short and long term storage, etc.) from several 
networks are exploited. The machines that can make the decision to share resources and 
route their packets effectively are getting their jobs done better than machines that do 
not cooperate (and sometimes, individual machines will not be able to carry out their 
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tasks at all without help from another resource-controlling machine). Here, decentraliza- 
tion among machines, the fact that several heterogeneous, distinct problem solvers are 
interacting, is not an artificial design decision, imposed from above. It is an intrinsic part 
of the system, an unavoidable consequence of the fact that the resources these machines 
control belong to different individuals or companies. 
Another example might involve an automated method for choosing a carrier for long- 
distance telephone calls. In this system, when a customer lifts the handset and dials a 
long-distance call, a microprocessor within the phone automatically collects bids from 
the various carriers. Each company’s computer simultaneously declares the price per 
minute at which it is willing to carry the call. The phone’s microprocessor collects these 
bids, and decides which company wins. The exact method by which the carrier is chosen, 
and how much it is paid, can drastically affect the appropriate bidding strategy for each 
of the telephone company computers [72]. The designers of the overall environment 
can induce certain kinds of behavior on the part of the heterogeneous computers by 
establishing particular rules for the interaction. 
As another example, consider meeting scheduling software. The problem solving 
that such software carries out cannot be done in isolation; the very nature of the 
task it performs involves interaction among machines. Distribution here arises as a 
natural aspect of, indeed a requirement of, the environment. A person who uses such 
software might be able to specify her preferences regarding alternative schedules. The 
interaction of scheduling agents is an encounter that is sensitive to the strategies being 
used. For example, one might conceal certain time slots so as to force a meeting at 
ones most convenient time. The mechanisms that establish how these programs set 
meetings can fundamentally alter the strategies of their users (and the outcome of their 
interaction). 
The techniques explored in this article can be directly applied to solving problems 
like those discussed above. For example, our approach has already been used to de- 
sign a meeting scheduling system that induces its users to reveal their true scheduling 
preferences, while efficiently establishing an optimal global schedule [ 231. 
1.2. Distributed artificial intelligence 
Multiagent activity is obviously facilitated by, and sometimes requires, agreement by 
the agents as to how they will act in the world. Reaching such a consensus has been 
a major concern of research in distributed artificial intelligence (DAI), and various 
alternative methods of achieving consensus among groups of autonomous agents have 
been suggested in the DA1 literature. 
Within the field of DAI, a distinction is sometimes made between two paradigms: 
distributed problem solving (DPS) and multiagent systems (MAS) [ 15].= Within the 
first paradigm, agents are assumed to be created by the same designer (or group of 
designers), and thus, work together to solve common goals. Using economic terms, the 
2 These terms are falling into disuse, as “multiagent systems” becomes the all-encompassing term for multi- 
agent research. The distinction between research emphases discussed in the article, however, remains. In the 
meantime, we’ll continue using these terms in the absence of superior alternatives. 
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agents have a common preference profile which yields an identical utility function. The 
common goal(s) may be decomposed into subgoals that are allocated to different agents 
in the group. Coordination is needed to allow efficient distributed activity towards the 
achievement of the global goal. While pursuing their tasks, agents may communicate, 
share their knowledge, and help each other. 
In the second paradigm, that of multiagent systems, agents may have their own private 
goals and act selfishly towards the achievement of these goals. Therefore each agent 
may have its private profile of preferences, and a distinct individual utility function. An 
assumption can be made that agents will help one another only when it is in their own 
best interests to do so. 
The distinction between distributed problem solving and multiagent systems should 
really be seen more as a distinction between research agendas, rather than between 
running systems. Certainly it will not always be obvious to an outside observer whether 
a given distributed system falls into one paradigm or the other. A single designer 
may have built his agents to act competitively, believing it improves overall system 
efficiency. Similarly, individually motivated agents might be seen sharing information 
and helping one another, because they have determined that it is in their own best 
interests to act that way. However, the research questions asked by a researcher in 
DPS may be distinct from those asked by an MAS researcher (despite a good deal 
of overlap in their research agendas). In particular, if a DPS researcher can show that 
acting in a particular way is good for the system as a whole, he can impose this be- 
havior on all the agents in the system at design time. For the MAS researcher, such 
an alternative is unavailable. At best, he might be able to design aspects of the en- 
vironment that motivate all the (selfish) agents to act in a certain way. This need 
for indirect incentives is one element that distinguishes MAS research from DPS re- 
search. 
The research reported on in this article is solidly within the area of multiagent 
systems. We consider multiagent societies that consist of heterogeneous agents that have 
been manufactured by different designers. Therefore we take the point of view that 
each agent acts in the best interests of its own designer, i.e., each agent acts rationally 
to maximize its own subjective expected utility (in the sense of Savage [77], who 
simultaneously axiomatized utility and subjective behavior). This is also in keeping with 
a large (and growing) body of work within artificial intelligence that attributes rationality 
(or explores the consequences of attributing rationality) to autonomous agents. See, for 
example, [11,25,34,42,46,70]. 
1.3. Overview of this article 
In this article we present a method for reaching consensus based on the Clarke tax 
mechanism [ 6,7] (CTm), and consider how this mechanism could be used among 
rational automated agents. Parts of this work have appeared previously in [ 18-20,221. 
In Section 2.1 we present the model of interaction that this article addresses, followed 
by an illustrative example and some initial definitions. Section 2.4 introduces the CTm. 
Section 3 suggests ways for agents to assess the worth of alternative states (a necessary 
ingredient to establishing preferences among alternatives). 
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The CTm has several major drawbacks for those who would want to use it in a 
practical implementation. In each of the subsequent sections of this article, we suggest 
a solution to one or more of these issues: 
( 1) The set ofjinal candidates over which the agents vote is assumed to be determined 
in advance of the vote. It is not obvious how this set should be generated, 
especially in a non-expensive way and without full knowledge of the individual 
agents’ goals. 
(2) Agents are required to calculate and reveal their exact and entire profile of pref- 
erences over the entire set of candidates. Although this was actually the conse- 
quence desired by the original inventor of the CTm, the designers of autonomous 
agents might prefer to conceal some information regarding their preferences. We 
use the CTm for the purposes of reaching consensus, and want the preferences 
that agents reveal to be true; however, we (as designers of the mechanism) 
would prefer the agents not to have to reveal all their preferences (the original 
CTm inventor did want them to reveal all their preferences). Moreover, the exact 
calculation of the entire set of preferences may be computationally expensive 
and under some circumstances extremely difficult. 
(3) All agents have equal influence on the decision procedure. Although desirable in 
many human scenarios, this fact might not be acceptable to all the designers of 
the agents involved. 
(4) The mechanism is sensitive to possible coalition formation. Groups of agents may 
collude in order to bend the groups’ decision in their favor. Although rational, 
such behavior may distort the outcome and cause it to be inefficient from a 
global (and perhaps local) perspective. 
Generation of candidate states by a central planner (issue ( 1) ) is discussed in Sec- 
tion 4. Determining this set of final candidates may be quite expensive computationally, 
and requires a full revelation of the individual goals. In Section 5 we address these 
two problems. We present a new approach to deriving multiagent plans by employing a 
variation of the CTm that eliminates the need to generate candidates ahead of time (i.e., 
an alternative approach to issue ( 1) ). In addition, the method maintains the agents’ 
privacy more effectively (issue (2) ) ; agents can reach consensus in a Clarke tax-like 
voting procedure, without having to reveal full preferences and goals (unless that is 
actually necessary for consensus to be reached). Agents iteratively converge to a plan 
that brings the group to a state maximizing social welfare. Section 5.6 shows how to 
relax one assumption of the original decision procedure, namely that agents have equal 
influence (issue (3)). In Section 5.7 we suggest a heuristic refinement of the plan 
aggregation process. 
Section 6 considers the situation where final candidates already exist, but we are 
interested in a method of protecting agents’ privacy and saving agents the burden of 
calculating their full preferences over all alternatives (unless that is necessary to reach 
consensus). This is a more direct treatment of issue (2), without the need to deal with 
candidate generation. 
Section 7 considers the fragility of the CTm with respect to possible coalition forma- 
tion (issue (4) ) . 
We conclude with a brief review of related work in Section 8. 
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Appendix B describes in greater detail the desirable solution properties for which 
we are looking, followed by some useful background material from voting theory, 
economics, and game theory. 
2. The Clarke tax 
The CTm was originally presented in the economics literature as a way to solve the 
so-called ,free rider problem [ 641. This problem was considered to be unsolvable prior 
to the introduction of the CTm. 3 
The original economic scenario was concerned with the way some central agency 
(government, project manager, etc.) could choose between two possible projects (“pub- 
lic goods”) based on the individual preferences of the members of the society. Once the 
decision is reached, each member of society is required to contribute money towards its 
realization based on the preferences that the member stated. It was soon realized that 
rational individuals will tend to declare untruthful preferences so as to be able to pay 
less once the decision is reached (i.e., understate their true preferences). These untruth- 
ful members that pay less are getting a “free ride” from the others. Such behavior may, 
under many circumstances, yield an inefficient global decision. This phenomenon of it 
being rational to falsely understate preferences has been overcome by the Clarke tax 
mechanism. For that reason it is also called a “preference revelation process”. 
Although we are concerned with somewhat different scenarios, the CTm is also a 
very desirable decision procedure for deriving consensus (coordination) in multiagent 
environments. 
2.1. The scenario 
Imagine a group A of N agents (possibly created by different designers) operating 
in a world currently in the state so, facing the decision of what to do next. One way 
of formulating this problem is to consider that the agents are trying to agree into which 
member of the set S of tn possible states the current world should be transformed. 
Each agent in A has its private goal. This goal gives rise to a worth, or utility, that 
it associates with each state. In turn that worth induces a preference relation over states 
and plans. Agent i’s true worth for state k will be denoted by wi( k). The preferences 
declared by an agent might differ from his true preferences. A decision procedure that 
chooses one state from S is a function from the agents’ declared preferences to a 
member of the set { 1,. , m}. It maps the agents’ declared preferences into a group 
decision as to how the world will be transformed. 
We are looking for an efficient decision procedure that will enable the agents to reach 
consensus and agree on a final state. 
’ Actually. a more general family of mechanisms. related to the Clarke tax, was independently introduced by 
Groves I40 I and received wider recognition. The underlying idea on which this family of mechanisms relies 
was list discovered by Vickrey in the context of a public auction I90 1. 
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Fig. I. A blocks world example of individual goals. 
2.2. An example 
Consider a simple scenario in the slotted blocks world.4 There are four slots (a, b, c, 
d), five blocks ( 1,2,3,4,5), and the world is described by the relations: On( Objl , 
Objz)-Objl is stacked onto Objz; Clear(Obj)-there is no object on Obj; and At(Obj, 
Slot)-Obj is located at Slot. The function loc(Obj) returns the location (slot) of Obj. 
There are three agents operating in the world. The start state is shown at the far left 
of Fig. 1. As further represented in that figure, these agents have (respectively) the 
following goals: 
gt = {At(4,c),At(2,b)}(Worth= 12), 
g2 = {On(2,4),On(5,2)}(Worth= 14), 
g3 = {On(3,2),At(2,c)}(Worth= 16). 
Slots themselves function as (stationary) objects (e.g., block 1 in slot b could be 
described by On( 1,b) ) . 
There is only one available operator: Move( Objl , Objz)-place Objl onto Obj2. This 
operator can be characterized by the following STRIPS-like lists: 
[ Prec: Clear( Objl ) , Clear( Objz) , On( Objl , Obj,) 1, 
[Del: On( Objl , Obj,) , Clear( Obj2) , At( Obj, , loc( Objl ) ) 1, 
[Add: On( Objl , Obj2) , At( Objl , loc( Obj2) ) I. 
Assume that when a single agent performs the Move operation there is a cost of 4, while 
if two agents Move an object together the operation costs a total of 3 ( 1.5 each). 
The problem is to find a plan to be carried out by all three agents that will bring 
the world to a compromise state that is in consensus. Preferably it will be a state that 
maximizes the group’s utility (by some definition of group utility). 
2.3. Basic dejinitions 
Throughout this article we use the following assumptions and definitions: 
4 While the blocks world is inappropriate for studying many real-world issues in robotics, it remains broadly 
suitable for the study of abstract goal interactions, which is how we use it. 
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There exists some kind of monetary system in the multiagent environment that 
allows side payments between agents. In other words, one agent can pay another 
and compensate him for doing some action, accepting some result, etc. We do not 
have to actually assume the existence of explicit currency; agents can trade using 
promised actions, for example, instead. The important point is that agreements can 
be facilitated by side payments, with utility transferred from one agent to another. 
Each agent ai has its own goal g;, which is a set of predicates. wi(s) is the 
worth (or utility) that agent i assigns to the state S. If s b gi, then wi(.s) is equal 
to the worth that i associates with his goal, nri( gl). The agents’ utility functions are 
additively separable. That is, an agent is indifferent between establishing a state S, 
that it assesses a worth ~i,( s). and establishing a state 4, that it assesses a worth 
wi( q), if the agent (in the latter case) is receiving a side payment of w;(s) - w;( 9). 
The plan P ( SO -+ sk) is the sequence 
O/1 - I 0,’ - 2 “,’ - 3 ,,/I-(k-l) “I’- f 
SO.++SI -+fQ-+... - Sk-1 * Sk. 
I( P ( SO + sk ) ) is the length ( k) of the plan that starts in SO and ends in Sk. 
C(i, SO - sz) denotes the minimal cost that it would take for a single agent i, 
in state SO, to bring about any state sK that satisfies g ( sLq /= g). P*(i. SO -+ sR) 
denotes the set of all plans that will bring about s,? with this minimal cost. 
C(so - si ) is the minimal cost needed to move the world from SO into si, using 
any combination of (multi)agent actions. Given a plan P(s0 -.+ sl), Ci(so y-1 SI ) 
is i’s share of the work in that plan. 
Clarke’s bidding mechanism 
The CTm is one of many one-shot voting-by-bid mechanisms that were invented 
within the fields of voting theory and economics. Unlike these other mechanisms, the 
CTm is non-manipulative; the basic idea of Clarke’s mechanism is to make sure that each 
voter has only one dominant strategy, telling the truth. This phenomenon is established 
by slightly changing the classic sealed bid mechanism:. instead of simply collecting 
the bid of the winning bidder, each agent is fined with a tax. The tax equals the portion 
of his bid that made a difference to the outcome. The example in Fig. 2 shows how to 
calculate this tax. Each row of the table shows several pieces of information regarding an 
agent. First, his preferences for each state are listed. Then, the total score that each state 
would have gotten, had the agent not voted, are listed. An asterisk marks the winning 
choice in each situation. 
For example, when all the agents voted, state s3 was chosen. If a2 had not voted, si 
would have been chosen. The score in this situation would have been (17, -22,5), and 
si would have beaten s3 by 12. Thus, agent a2 has affected the outcome by his vote, 
and he has affected it by a “magnitude” of 12; he is therefore fined 12. Agents al, a~, 
and as are not fined because even without the vote of each of them (separately), s3 
would still have been chosen. 
5 In the sealed bid mechanism, agents bid by submitting a secret offer; the agent with the highest bid wins. 
It can be shown that this mechanism is manipulable; agents might benefit by submitting false bids. 
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True worth of each state Sum for each state without i Tax for i 
s1 $2 J-3 SI $2 s3 
a I 27 -33 6 -46 *23 *23 0 
a2 -36 12 24 *17 -22 5 12 
(13 -9 24 -15 -10 -34 *44 0 
fl4 -18 -15 33 -I *s -4 9 
a5 17 2 -19 -36 -12 *48 0 
sum -19 -10 *29 
Fig. 2. Calculating the Clarke tax. 
Given this scheme, revealing true preferences is the dominant strategy. An agent that 
overbids (so that some given state will win) risks having to pay a tax larger than his 
true preferences warrant. Similarly, the only way to pay less tax is to actually change 
the outcome-and any agent that underbids (to change the outcome and save himself 
some tax) will always come out behind; the saved tax will never compensate him for 
his lost utility.‘j 
Note the distinction between private preferences and public behavior. It is relatively 
easy to monitor and enforce public behavior; so, for example, it will be publically known 
if an agent owes tax, and paying the tax can then be enforced. The private preferences 
of an agent are entirely different. There is no way to observe the private preferences of 
an agent, or directly know if its stated preferences match its private preferences. Thus, 
there is the need for an indirect mechanism like the CTm. But once such a mechanism 
is in place, we assume corresponding public behavior (like tax paying) can be ensured. 
2.5. Attributes of the CTm 
The Clarke tax decision mechanism is appealing because it satisfies many desirable 
properties of social decision mechanisms (for a wide-ranging discussion of common 
solution concepts for social decision processes, see Appendix B). 
First, it is not manipulable by individuals-any other declaration of preferences is 
dominated by declaring the truth. Therefore, it saves each agent from the computational 
complexity of guessing what the others’ preferences and strategies are, what the negotia- 
tion set is, and how it can be manipulated. This simplicity of strategy is highly desirable 
in the design of automated agents. The agents tell the truth out of their own self- 
interest-there is no need to assume that agents will act benevolently by design. Thus, 
the process answers both the “simplicity” and “stability” criteria (see Appendix B) . 
A second advantage of the technique is that it satisfies several desirable criteria, in- 
cluding the “condorcet winner” (a choice that would have beaten every other choice 
in pairwise votes is guaranteed to be chosen by the mechanism [ 26]), “monotonicity” 
(by giving an alternative a higher value, an agent cannot undermine the alternative’s 
6 For a formal proof that revealing true preferences is the dominant strategy, consider the proof of Lemma 3 
in Appendix A where Zi = 1 for all i. 
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Fig. 3. Alternative tinal states. 
selection ) , “independence of irrelevant alternatives” (removal of any “unchosen” al- 
ternative from the set of alternatives will not change the outcome ]88] ), “individual 
rationality” (an agent may only gain utility by taking part in the process), “anonymity” 
and “neutrality” (the identity of a voter or the name of an alternative has no influence 
on the outcome), “expressiveness” (preferences are expressed using the actual cardinal 
utilities), it is relatively simple, and finally the process can be designed to preserve 
privacy since the actual choice function uses only the total sum of preferences. 
A third advantage is that the alternative chosen by the Clarke tax mechanism an- 
swers a social welfare criterion similar to the summation criterion mentioned in Ap- 
pendix B [89]. In fact, the Clarke mechanism is just one member of the family of 
Groves mechanisms [40]. It has been proven in economics that any decision mech- 
anism that chooses a state with the same properties as the CTm does, and that also 
has telling the truth as a dominant strategy, belongs to this family [ 361. However, the 
CTm requires the least amount of tax to be paid, from among the members of this 
decision mechanism family [ 541. It guarantees the best minimal utility level for each 
of the participants, and is the only mechanism within this family that has no free rider 
problem [63] (i.e., an agent will not be tempted to avoid the process, hoping to benefit 
from the decision without the risk of paying the tax). 
3. Calculation of preferences 
Since telling the truth is the dominant strategy when the Clarke tax is being used, it 
is in each agent’s interest to compute his true preferences over the potential alternative 
states. The preference profile is based on the worth that each agent assigns to each 
alternative state. The way by which (true) worth is associated with states obviously has 
a crucial influence on the outcome of the group decision. In this section we suggest 
several conceptually different approaches for an agent to determine the worth of a given 
state. 
As an example, consider the scenario in the blocks world as described in Fig. 1. For the 
sake of simplicity, assume that each Move action costs 1, and that wi (gi) = Ci( SO -u-) g;) . 
In that case, WI (gi ) = 2, w2( g2) = 3, and w3 (gs) = 4. Assume that the agents in state 
SO are faced with choosing among six alternative future states as shown in Fig. 3 (we 
will later discuss how alternatives are to be generated). 
3.1. The assessment oj’a single state’s w’orth 
For the “worth” of a given state to be meaningful, it should be a function of the 
initial state, the state itself, and the agent’s goal (for a similar argument, see [24]). 
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It is easier for a social consensus procedure to find compromise consensus states when 
agents’ worth functions are not binary (i.e., agents will be partially satisfied by states, 
see for example [ 19,941) . 
According to the “all-or-nothing” approach, the agent assigns the full value of his 
goal to any state that satisfies it, and zero otherwise. In the example in Fig. 3, s4 would 
be chosen, causing a3 to pay a tax of 3. In the general case, the state that satisfies 
the single most valuable private goal will be chosen, unless there is a state that fully 
satisfies more than one goal. This approach suffers from the fact that an agent cannot 
assign relative weights to the alternatives, and no mutual compromise can be achieved. 
A more flexible approach (“partial satisfaction”) is for the agent to give each state a 
worth that represents the portion of the agent’s goal that the state satisfies, i.e., which 
predicates in the agent’s composite goal are satisfied in the state. Assume that each of 
the agents’ goal predicates contributes equally to the worth associated with a state. In 
the example, s4 is again chosen, but a3 pays a tax of only 1.5. This approach is superior 
in the sense that compromise can be achieved via a state that partially satisfies a group 
of different goals. But in addition to preventing the agent from ranking bad alternatives 
(since there are no negative valuations), the method can be misleading. Consider, for 
example, ~2. His evaluation of SI (1.5) is based on the fact that $1 satisfies On(5,2), 
while any attempt to achieve his other subgoal, On(2,4), will require the violation of 
this predicate. 
Yet a third approach (“future cost”) is to evaluate a state by taking into consideration 
the cost of the agent’s eventually achieving his full goal, given that state: wi(k) = 
wi(gi) - Ci(sk * gi). Consider as calculating the worth of st. Given SO, he could 
achieve his goal using four Move operations; our assumption is thus that his goal’s value 
is 4. Given ~1, however, he would need five Move operations, Move( 5, d), Move(4,5), 
Move( 3,4), Move( 2, c) and Move( 3,2). He is therefore “worse off” by 1, and gives st 
a worth of -1. In the example in Fig. 3, this yields the following true worths for each 
agent: (2,0,1,0, -2,2), (0,3,2,1,1,0), (-1,2,3,4,1,1). s3 (which is only one Move 
operation distant from all the agents’ goals) is chosen, and no tax is collected. 
The second and third approaches above allow greater compromise than does the first, 
yielding states that are guaranteed to have greater social welfare. However, they may 
not improve the outcome for individual agents, who therefore might prefer to operate 
according to the more rigid first approach. 
In some sense, this last method guarantees a “fair” consensus (where all agents are 
approximately equally distant from their ultimate goals). If it is important that some 
agent’s goal be fully satisfied, a coin can be tossed to determine which of the agents 
will continue and fulfill his complete goal. Given a distribution of labor, the utility of 
an agent using this scheme may be greater than it would be if we had a lottery to select 
one agent, then let that agent bring about his own goal.’ 
However, the valuation of a state based on its closeness to a desired final state is 
obviously domain dependent. In some situations, there may really exist the possibility 
’ See (93 I for an example of a similar scenario. Two agents agree to cooperate to an intermediate state 
that satisfies neither, then flip a coin to see who, alone, continues to his own goal. There, the cooperation is 
brought about by negotiation instead of voting. 
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of arriving in the final state at some future time; in other situations, the value of a state 
may really be related to its proximity to some desired final state, even if the final state is 
not ever achieved (a chip manufacturer might be increasingly pleased, the fewer faults 
appear in his chips, even if he can never reach the ultimate desired situation where there 
are no faults). However, this is clearly an inappropriate technique in some domains, 
where intermediate states, viewed as final, have worths unrelated to their distance from 
the goal. 
3.2. “Progressive” worth functiorzs 
Let’s consider a slightly more sophisticated way of evaluating the worth of arbitrary 
states. Since an agent may have to contribute to the social effort of reaching any 
particular (intermediate) state, it also makes sense to take into account his share of the 
initial work, and to decrease his evaluation of worth appropriately. 
A straightforward worth function for an arbitrary state s might be built as follows: 
take the worth of a goal state (assumed to be available), subtract the cost of the 
single-agent plan to get from s to the goal, then subtract the agent’s share of the cost 
of the multiagent plan to get from start state SO to s. This gives us the worth of s: 
W;(S) = Wi(gj) - C(i,S -4 g;) - C,(So -ri S). 
Note, however, that using the above equation the worth of SO for an agent would 
simply be the worth of his goal, minus the cost of his one-agent plan to reach that goal 
(in a one-agent scenario this would be true for every state). Thus, since the evaluation 
function does not capture the notion of progress in the plan, a rational agent would have 
no motivation to carry out his plan at all. * 
There are several ways to refine the worth function so as to solve this problem. One 
way is by making the “future cost” (i.e., Wi(gj) - C( i, s u-t gi) ) more sensitive to 
the progress of the plan (that is, weighted so that states far away from the goal are 
assigned proportionately less worth). A simple approach is to take into consideration 
only that fraction of the goal’s worth that reflects the amount of work already done 
to achieve it (z W&i) x ]~(P(so + s))/l(P(s +-+ gi))] ). Another way is to give 
greater weight to the cost of operators that are located further along in the plan (z 
w;(g;) - Et k x C(opk) ). Or, assuming that each operator has a probability (pr(opk)) 
associated with its success, we could use z (flfpr(opk) x wi(g;)) - C(i, s us gi). 
These evaluations may be further refined by having costs or probability of success 
associated with the constraints that enable a plan (see [ 42,471 for richer probabilistic 
approaches). 
There is an important restriction that we would like to place on the class of worth 
functions used by our agents. In Section 5, we will be introducing a pruning method 
that allows multiple agents to cut off search for optimal states when the group’s global 
utility function decreases during the search. Therefore, we require that there be no local 
minima in the global utility function, or that the maximal depth of such a minima be 
known in advance. Formally, we use the following definitions: 
s This is reminiscent of the Little Nell planning paradox, where an agent solves his problem by deriving a 
suitable plan. but has no need to carry it out once he identifies that it indeed solves his problem [ 581. 
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l A set of worth functions will be called strictly progressive if between any two 
states si and Sk, such that u( Sk) 2 U(Si), there exists no state, Sj, such that 
U(s.;) < U(Q). 
l Similarly, let 6 be the maxima1 gap bound between any local maximum of i/ and 
any local minimum that follows it, of any given set of worth functions. We then 
say that the set is S-progressive. 
Under many conditions, the above worth functions are strictly progressive. For ex- 
ample, when we use the “future cost” technique, it would be sufficient to assume that 
Vi( C( s1 y-) ~2) < C( i, SI + ~2) . The decision procedure we propose in Section 5 is 
most suitable for progressive worth functions. 
4. Centralized generation of alternatives 
The selection of the candidate states (among which the agents will vote) plays a 
crucial role in the voting process. 9 Given a group of agents with fixed goals, choosing 
different candidates can result in wildly different outcomes. The question thus arises of 
how these candidate states are to be generated. It is desirable that this generation process 
be a function of the agents’ goals. In this section, we describe a heuristic approach to 
generate alternative consensus states (i.e., candidate states) by a central planner, given 
the agents’ goals. In Section 5, we introduce an iterative multiagent planning algorithm 
to derive such states in a way that requires the agents to reveal only the minima1 
necessary information about their private goals. 
The generation of candidate states should aspire to choosing states maxima1 with 
respect to the satisfaction of agents’ goals. Let Px = UaiEA(gi) be the set of all the 
predicates appearing in all the agents’ goals. Usually this does not specify a real-world 
state, since in the general case there are contradictory predicates among different agents’ 
goals (otherwise, this state is guaranteed to be chosen). 
We want it to be the case that each Sk in the set of candidate states satisfies the 
following definition: Sk = (p ) p E pz and p is consistent with Sk}. Thus, each Sk is a 
maxima1 feasible subset of Pz, a fixed point with respect to the predicates’ consistency. 
To check consistency, we assume a set of axioms over the domain predicates by which 
inconsistency can be discovered. In the example above we might have 
On( Obj, t) a At( Obj, t) , 
[At(Objl,t) ~On(Obj2,Objl)I +At(Objz,t), 
[At(Obj, tl) A At(Obj, t2) A (tl Z tz)] + False 
to establish the inconsistency of a set such as (At(2, b), On(2,5> ,At(5, c)}. lo 
9 The agents cannot vote over all possible states, as the large number of such states would make the voting 
process intractable. 
to Of course, it is not clear how such axioms should be generated [ 1632,331. In any case, the use of such 
axioms to check consistency produces an NP-hard problem, unless the database consists of Horn clauses. It 
seems more reasonable to consider the use of such consistency axioms as an idealized mechanism, and any 
realistic system would have to make do with heuristic approximations. 
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Note that this process of generation has several features. First, the procedure guaran- 
tees for each i the existence of at least one Sk such that g; C Sk. Second, each agent is 
motivated to hand the generator his true goal. Declaring 2; > gi might prevent the gen- 
eration of compromise states that benefit a,, or cause the generation of states preferable 
to other agents (resulting in the selection of a worse alternative than otherwise would 
have been chosen). Declaring (2; / (& n g,) c gi or (8; n gi) = 8) may prevent the 
generation of any Sk that satisfies gi, as well as preventing the generation of other states 
preferred by a, which otherwise could have been chosen. In either case, a; cannot hope 
to improve on his utility.” 
Note that the phase of candidate generation is completely distinct from the Clarke tax 
voting phase that follows it. An agent could declare goals that are used in generating 
candidates, and then vote in ways that contradict its declared desires. Note also that 
the technique above assumes the collection of information regarding agents’ goals in a 
central location. This, of course, may be undesirable in a distributed system because of 
bottlenecks and communication overhead. In Section 5, we suggest several techniques 
for distributing the generation of alternatives among agents. 
4. I. Additional criteria in candidate generation 
Candidate state generation can be refined by taking into consideration several addi- 
tional criteria that avoid dominated states. These additional criteria are sometimes related 
to the approach agents will use to evaluate the worth of candidate states. 
First, the generator can exclude states Sk such that 3sk [ vi( Wi( k) 3 w;(E) ) A (c( so - 
Sk) < C(SO - Sk))]. In other words, the generator can exclude a candidate state if 
there is another of equivalent value that is easier to reach. In the example in Fig. 3, this 
test causes the elimination of the state {At( 3, c) , At(4, b) , On(2,4), On(5,2)} in favor 
of s2. 
If the agents are going to evaluate candidate states using the “partial satisfaction” 
criterion, the generator can exclude Sk such that 3sk [ (Sk n p$) C (Sk n ?z) ]. In other 
words, the generator will exclude a candidate that specifies states that are a superset of 
another candidate’s states. In the example, this would exclude .sj in favor of SZ. 
If the agents are going to evaluate candidate states using the “future cost” criterion, 
the generator can eliminate states .?k such that 3.‘?k [v’i( c;( Sk + gi) < cj( Sk -+ gi)) A 
gi(ci(sk M gj) < c,(sk - g;) ) 1. In other words, the generator can exclude a candidate 
that, for all agents, is “more expensive” than another candidate. I2 In the example, such 
a test would eliminate the state s5 in favor of .~a. 
One might suppose that if it is known ahead of time how candidate states are going 
to be evaluated, the Clarke tax voting phase i&elf becomes redundant. By extension 
of elimination procedures such as those above, the generator could just compute the 
‘I This contrasts with cases where an agent can benefit from misrepresenting his goals, as in [ 7 I I The key 
difference here is that agents will eventually engage in a non-manipulable voting process, namely one based 
on the Clarke tax mechanism, which eliminates the possibility of useful deception in the candidate generation 
phase as well. 
I2 Actually. more or equally expensive for all agents, and more expensive for at least one. 
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optimal state. For instance, using the “future cost” criterion, it might directly generate 
the sk that minimizes cr Ci (Sk * gi), and using the “partial satisfaction” criterion, it 
might directly choose the Sk that is the maximal (with respect to number of predicates) 
consistent subset of Px. 
However, such extensions to the generation method are not always desirable. If the 
state generator uses them, the agents will sometimes be motivated to declare false 
goals. For example, if al declares his goal to be (At(4, c) ,At( 2, b) , On(4,3), On( 5,2)} 
(whose predicates are a superset of his original goal), s1 becomes dominant over all the 
other states if the generator uses either of the two global extensions considered above. 
Thus sI would automatically be chosen, and al achieves a higher utility by lying. The 
two-phase method we propose, where candidates are generated and then agents vote 
using a Clarke tax mechanism, eliminates such undesirable effects. 
5. Dynamic search for alternatives as multiagent planning 
The central generation of alternative consensus states suffers from two significant 
drawbacks. First, the entire set of alternative states needs to be calculated prior to the 
voting procedure and therefore all agents have to reveal their goals before the vote takes 
place. Second, the participating agents are expected to declare their exact and entire set 
of utilities and preferences over this set of alternatives. Indeed, in the original economic 
scenario, one objective of the mechanism was to let the “planner” know the complete 
set of preferences. The designers of automated agents might have an interest, however, 
in reaching the right decision, but ensuring agents’ privacy as much as possible; at the 
same time, they would like the agents to generate only alternatives that are likely to be 
in the consensus (for reasons of efficiency). 
To accomplish both these aims, we can make repetitive use of votes that employ 
the Clarke tax mechanism and converge to a consensus decision. In the following 
sections, we present a novel iterative voting procedure, based on the original Clarke tax 
mechanism, that enables agents to reach a decision of maximal social utility with only 
partial information. 
We employ a dynamic search by a group of agents for all states that maximize 
their social utility. At each step, the agents vote (using the CTm) about the next joint 
action to be taken (i.e., what the next state will be for the group). This technique has 
several desirable properties: agents need not fully reveal their preferences, and the set 
of alternative final states need not be generated in advance of a vote. 
In effect, the voting procedure gives rise to a new multiagent planning technique. 
Through a process of group constraint aggregation, the agents iteratively converge to a 
plan that brings the group to a state maximizing social welfare. Another advantage of 
the process is that it has lower complexity than the original centralized process from the 
previous section. 
5.1. Notation 
We use the following definitions in the description of our planning procedure and the 
embedded stepwise CTm: 
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l At each step of the process, additional alternative states are generated. Sk denotes 
the set of states that have been generated up to the kth iteration of the process. 
l The function L’; : Sk ----t R, returns the true normalized worth (to ai) of each state 
(Vi(~);(s) = wi( s) - w;( so) ) ) . The function d:(j) returns the declared worth of 
state sj by agent ai at step k. d;k denotes the vector (dF( l),df(2), . . . ,d,k(m)), 
the agent’s declared worth over all alternatives. 
l The profile of preferences declared by all agents at step k is denoted by D,k, where 
05; denotes this set excluding i’s preferences, such that Di = (D$, df ). 
l The choice function f : 0: -+ Sk returns the state that is the maximizer of 
Cry, df (s), where s is an element of Sk. 
l The tax imposed on i at step k is 
f;(f(Df;:)) = xd;(f(D!,,H -- Cd.;(f(D$,df)), 
;ir j#r 
if this value is positive. Otherwise, I: will be zero. Therefore, the utility I.$( f( 0:)) 
of agent i with respect to the chosen alternative is wi( f( 0,“) ) - tf (f( 0,“) ). 
l T(P) is the set of absolutely necessary constraints needed for the plan P to succeed. 
In accordance with the partial order over these constraints, I3 we divide Z(P) into 
subsets of constraints. Each such subset within Z(P) comprises all the constraints 
that can be satisfied within j (optimal) steps, and are necessary at some subsequent 
step after j. 
We denote Z( P)‘s components by Uj P(P), such that Ij includes all the con- 
straints that can be satisfied at the jth step of the plan, and are necessary at some 
step 3 j. For any j > l(P), we define lj to be the goal achieved by P. 
l A constraint I E fj is said to be temporary if later in the plan there is a constraint 
1 E f k (where k > j) that denies it (I A f + False). We say that a set of apparently 
conflicting constraints G is semi-consistent (G FtlP False) if the removal of 
temporary constraints makes it consistent (see Section 5.4 for an example). A 
virtual stute is a state that is specified by a semi-consistent set of predicates. In 
such a state, semi-consistent predicates may co-exist. Given a virtual state u we 
define r(u) to be the set of real states that it maps onto, that is, all maximally 
consistent subsets of the predicates in U. Note that for any real state s, r(s) = s. 
l P(G) denotes the set of the cheapest “grounded” plans (what Chapman calls 
“complete” plans [ 51) of the temporally ordered set of constraints G. Each such 
plan results in a certain real or virtual state. We signify the set of all these states (the 
states induced by G) by s(G) (we are only concerned with the cheapest states that 
satisfy G, in other words, s(G) = {s 1 s b GAC(so ^rct s) =min+GC(so -+ k)}). 
follow(G) is defined to be the set of constraints that can be satisfied by invoking 
at most one operator on any state in s(G) ( fOl/ow( G) = {I ) 3op3P [ op( P (G) ) b 
,111. 
I3 Constraints are temporally ordered sets of the domain’s predicates associated with the appropriate limitations 
on their codesignation [ 5 1. In a STRIPS-like planning system, these “constraints” are actually the preconditions 
required by operators. 
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Fig. 4. Overview of the process. 
5.2. General overview of the search 
The algorithm, presented in this section, allows a group of agents to find the state 
that maximizes their social welfare. The underlying idea is the dynamic generation of 
alternatives to locate the most desirable state for the society. At each step, all agents 
reveal additional information about their private goals. The current set of candidate states 
is then expanded and (possibly) pruned to comprise the new set of candidate states. 
The process continues until no new states are generated with higher social utility. 
The entire process is illustrated in Fig. 4. As represented by gray arrows in the upper 
part of the figure, each agent has a private set of constraints. Given the initial state SO, by 
incrementally satisfying this set, its private goal will be achieved. These private sets of 
constraints are aggregated iteratively. At each step, each agent may try to impose more 
of its private constraints on the group’s decision. This is done by declaring alternative 
feasible private extensions to all “live” sets of aggregated constraints. 
The search for the global plan is through the space of states. A partial plan in the 
queue of alternative plans is identified by the states that it induces. Given some specific 
initial state, the agents will go through the following loop until they derive all the plans 
that reach states with maximal social welfare. 
Until all maximal social welfare states have been found, do: 
1. Identify all the promising successor states that can be reached from the first 
path in the queue. Each successor state represents a feasible set of constraints 
(propositions) that can be satisfied given that path. The relevant sets are deter- 
mined by aggregating the sets of constraints that each agent may declare, based 
on its individual plan. 
2. Determine the (fraction of the global) multiagent plan that achieves each suc- 
cessor state. 
3. Based on the individual plans and the actual path that leads to each successor, 
determine the heuristic value of each newly formed path. 
4. Add new successors into the queue according to their heuristic values. 
The search procedure, to proceed correctly, needs an accurate value for the social 
utility of each candidate state (i.e., the search space of alternatives is pruned dynamically 
by the social welfare criterion). To provide this value, the agents vote over the set of 
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candidates at each step. The Clarke tax mechanism is then used at the end of the 
procedure, to ensure that agents’ votes throughout will be honest. 
The search method is in effect a parallel A* search. For example, the value of a state 
(its social utility) is taken to be the sum of individual estimates of the distance to the 
goal state (the h’ component) and the actual cost of achieving it (the g component). But 
parallel searches are carried out simultaneously in each promising direction (wherever 
social utility does not decrease). When the search encounters a direction where social 
utility decreases, the search is terminated (that path is pruned). This method is illustrated 
in the lower part of Fig. 4: each set of aggregated constraints has corresponding (real or 
virtual) states that it induces. Starting at the initial state, so, at each step of the process, 
all “live” descendents are considered. Then their possible successors are generated. A 
state that reduces the social utility (by more than S) in comparison to its parent, is 
pruned. 
The agents are participating in many intermediate votes. Since each intermediate vote 
is only over a subset of candidates, there is the possibility that an agent will “shift” 
his vote by a constant, keeping a single round’s preferences accurate while undermining 
inter-vote comparisons. For example, an agent voting over SO and $1 might give the 
first a value of 0 and the second a value of 5. If that agent subsequently voted over 
s2 and $3, he might assign the first 0 and the second g-but if he had voted over all 
four alternatives at once, s2 and ST would have been shifted up by 3, giving votes of 
0, 5, 3, and 11 to the candidates. The Clarke tax which is levied at the end of the 
procedure requires that artificial shifting does not occur. Therefore, we will require that 
all votes be relative to some “benchmark”: we include SO in the set of alternatives at 
every step, and require that each agent give worth 0 to that state. If each agent gives his 
true preferences to the other states relative to so ( ui( s) ), then the score of each state s 
in the vote is exactly uO( s). 
5.3. The algorithm 
This section describes the algorithm in more detail, along with a running example. At 
each step of the procedure, agents try to impose more of their private constraints on the 
group’s aggregated set of sets of constraints. Since agents want to maximize their own 
utility, they will impose as many constraints as they can at each step. 
As an example, assume a simple scenario of the slotted blocks world as described in 
Fig. 5 (we use the same operators and predicates as described in Section 2.2). There are 
three blocks (1, 2, 3) and two agents (al, a2). The initial state is {On( l,b),On(3, l), 
On( 2, c)}. The agent’s goals are (respectively) gl = {On( 1,2)} and g2 = {On(2,3)}. I4 
The set of all unpruned sets of constraints at step k is denoted by Gk (its constituent 
sets will be denoted by GJ”, where ,j is simply an index over those sets). G/k denotes 
the set Gk before it is pruned. The exact procedure is defined as follows: 
I4 This is reminiscent of Sussman’s anomaly in the single-agent planning scenario-where the plan to achieve 
one subgoal obstructs the plan that achieves the other [ 85 1. Although the final state that satisfies both agents’ 
goals in our example costs 9 to reach, and is therefore relatively expensive, it is the state that meets the social 
welfare criterion. 
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Fig. 5. A simpler blocks world example. 
Initialize: At step 0 each agent i finds Zi = Z( P* (i, SO * gi))-the temporally 
ordered sets of constraints imposed by any optimal skeleton plan that achieves the goal 
g;. The virtual set of alternatives is initialized to be the empty set, and its induced set 
of states is initialized to be so (Go = 0 and So = {se}). 
In our example, we have: I5 11 = {[C(2)] U [C(2),C(l)] U [0(1,2)]} (this or- 
dered set induces the plan (M(3,2),M(1,2))) and 12 = {[C(3),C(2)] U [0(2,3)]} 
(inducing the pl an (M(2,3))). Note that C(2) and ~(3) are temporary since they are 
denied later by the induced plan. 
Loop to step 5: At step k each agent may declare Z/ G Z:+’ only if he has already 
fully declared Z/ (for any j) and the declaration is “feasible”, i.e., it is possible to 
reach a state that satisfies those constraints: 3G[ (G E Ok) A (lJh=, Z: G G) A (ZL! C 
./‘ol[nw (G) ) I. 
i is allowed to try to impose elements of his “next” private subset of constraints 
on the group decision only if they are still relevant and his previous constraints 
were accepted by the group. Notice that it is in i’s best interest to give a true 
declaration, since bringing about Zp’ is useless without establishing Zj first. Such 
insincere declarations can also be easily tracked by the other agents, since an 
insincerely declared constraint will not be used subsequently. 
At the first step, each agent i will declare Zd,. In our example, this will be 
Zi = [C(2)] and Zi = [C(3),C(2)1. 
At the second step, al declares ZF’, which in this example is equal to ZF = 
[c(z),C(l)]. Similarly, a2 declares Ei2 = [0(2,3)]. (Both are in F,~&dr), 
which contains only one subset.) 
At the third step, al declares [0( 1,2)] and a:! declares [ 0(2,3) I (his final 
goal, which already appears in G2). 
2. The set N(@) of all possible extensions of “live” sets in @ is set to be the 
union of all agents’ declarations at step k, i.e., Ui Z/. The set N(Ek) is not 
necessarily consistent. Then, for each set of constraints Gf E Sk, we generate all 
the maximally consistent or semi-consistent extensions, G;?’ , of Gjk with elements 
of N(Gk) (i.e., {Gj, k+’ = Gf u {Z 1 (I E n/(@)) A ((I u G;:‘) p,, False)}}). 
G’k+1 denotes the union of all these extensions. 
At the first step, the aggregated set of constraints is {C(3), C(2)}. 
” We will use the first letter to denote the full operator predicate, and p to denote any location excluding .v’s. 
We will use a typewriter font to denote temporary constraints. 
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At the second step, both declarations may co-exist consistently, and there is 
therefore only one successor to the previous set of constraints: {C(2), C( l), 
(X2,3)}. 
At the third step, the aggregated set is {0( 1,2), 0( 2,3)}, and it satisfies both 
agents’ goals. 
3. At this stage, all extensions are evaluated to enable the pruning of sets that reduce 
social utility (by more than the bound 6). The evaluation is done by first evaluating 
all the states that an extension induces: 
(a) Let S be the set of all newly formed alternative states with respect to the new 
setsofconstraints (i.e., S={sj GEG’@‘AsE r(s(G))}\Sk).Sk+’ isset 
to be Sk U S. 
(b) Each agent gives its vote to each state in SU {so}. The worth of a real state 
is simply the sum of individual worths given to that state. The worth of a 
virtual state 0 in G’k+’ . IS computed as follows. For each state o there is a 
set of real states that it maps onto, namely r(u). For each agent and virtual 
state, there is a real state with maximal worth. The worth of the virtual state 
is taken to be the sum of these maximal worth states in T(U), over all agents 
(C; max,E,(,.) Wi(S) ). 
(c) The normalized social utility (r/o(s)) of each state is found by subtracting 
its cost C(sa * s) from its worth. The utility of the set of constraints G 
is defined to be highest utility given to any of the states that it “induces” 
(p(G) = max,Es(G) t?(s) ). 
4. The next set of sets of constraints is pruned to contain only sets that do not 
decrease, by more than S, the social utility with respect to the set from which they 
were formed. Formally, Gkf’ = {G;+’ / G.7’ E S’k+’ A [ Uc’( Gyt ) 2 Ue( G,k) - 
611. 
The first set of aggregated constraints is satisfied by the initial state, and thus 
induces the null plan (with cost of zero). The value given to that first set is the 
value that agents assign to the initial state. 
The second set can be achieved by the plan (M( 3, a)), with cost of 3. In order 
for the set not to be pruned, it must be the case that the agents value the set by 
at least 3 - 6 more than the initial set. 
The third set is the set that satisfies the social welfare criterion (as we stated 
above), and therefore (by definition) will have higher value than previous steps 
(and not be pruned). 
5. Loop termination test: The process ends when gk+’ = Gk (and, thus, Sk+’ = Sk). 
The votes given by each agent to each state in Sk are then combined using a CTm 
to determine Sk, the set of states that maximizes the social utility (Sk = {s 1 s E 
Sk A\Js*[s* E Sk =+ @(s*) < u”(s)]}). A mong these states one is randomly 
chosen and each agent is fined the Clarke tax with respect to this choice. 
To realize the true social utility of each state, each agent has to reveal his true 
preferences during the vote at each step. The Clarke tax makes this behavior dominant 
(i.e., preferable to any other behavior). As described in the last step (step 5) of the 
procedure above, in order to choose the jnal consensus state, all the votes are gathered 
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together in a Clarke tax vote. The state to be chosen must be a real (not virtual) state; 
therefore, virtual states may not be included in the final vote, and thus not in any of 
the intermediate votes that determine it. For example, an agent might find incentives to 
manipulate its vote on a virtual state, knowing that this vote would not be subject to 
the Clarke tax. For that reason, the virtual states are treated in a special way (step 3(b) 
above). 
Note that since so is included in each Sk, each agent must give the same bid (i.e., 
0) for SO, and thus his true preferences are always (at any step) bounded to reflect 
the worth of the other states in comparison to Wi( so) (see Section B.2). For that same 
reason, agents actually have to determine only the worth of the newly formed states 
(step 3(a) of the procedure). Given these considerations, the following lemma proves 
that honesty is the dominant strategy. The theorem that follows then states some of the 
desirable attributes of the procedure. 
Lemma 1. At any step k of the procedure, i’s best strategy is to vote over the al- 
ternatives at that step (Sk) according to his true normalized preferences Vi (that is, 
subtracting wi( so) from wi( s) for any s). 
All proofs of lemmas and theorems in this article appear in Appendix A. 
The lemma above demonstrates a subtle consequence of the “independence of irrel- 
evant alternatives” property of the original CTm. An agent cannot change the winning 
alternative simply by causing other alternatives to be pruned. Moreover, directly causing 
another alternative to win (either by overbidding that alternative, or underbidding the 
rightful winner) will expose the agent to the Clarke tax. 
Theorem 2. Given any set of S-progressive individual worth functions, and the cor- 
responding S, this mechanism finds all states that satisfy the social welfare criterion. 
Consensus will be reached after 0( max,,=sw(s) I( P( so +-+ s) ) ) steps (the order of the 
length of the plan that derives the most distant state that answers the social welfare 
criterion, from the initial state). 
Note that the search is intended to find all states that satisfy the social welfare 
criterion. If we were to interrupt the search after the first such state were found, we 
would not necessarily have found the shortest path to such a state (i.e., our A* search 
is not admissible with respect to the length of the path). 
In comparison with the classic CTm, the procedure has the following advantages: (a) 
agents are required to submit only the minimally “conflict-sufficient” information about 
preferences over alternatives, thus maintaining a certain amount of privacy; (b) prefer- 
ences will be calculated and submitted only for “feasible” alternatives (preferences over 
infeasible alternatives need not be revealed) ; (c) alternatives are generated by the entire 
voting group dynamically (making the procedure more distributed, and computationally 
more tractable). 
The search process is also superior to the central generation of alternatives for several 
additional reasons: (a) conflicts and “positive” interactions are addressed within a unified 
framework; (b) the branching factor of the search space is strictly constrained by the 
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Fig. 6. Three scenarios in the slotted blocks world 
individual plans’ constraints (the kind of “cone” that is shown in the upper part of 
Fig. 4); (c) the A*-type algorithm uses a relatively good heuristic function, because 
it is derived “bottom-up” from the plans that the agents have already generated (not 
simply an artificial h’ function); (d) generation of successors in the search tree is split 
up among the agents (each doing a part of the search for a successor). 
5.1. Specijcation ad aggregatiotl of‘ constraints 
There are several important aspects of, and requirements for, the procedure above: 
l The procedure’s success depends on each agent identifying and declaring only the 
absolutely necessary constraints needed for its individual plan to succeed. 
l It is necessary that temporary conflicts among the agents’ plans not cause deadlocks 
(that is, if there is a temporal order that can later resolve them). This phenomenon 
is achieved in our procedure by allowing the existence of semi-consistent sets of 
constraints and then voting on the virtual states that they induce. 
l The generation of consensus sets of constraints is based on the aggregation of 
individual sets of constraints. This is not always trivial to do. 
Fig. 6 shows three simple scenarios of the slotted blocks world that illustrate the 
above issues. In these examples, two agents can achieve a consensus state that fully 
satisfies both agent’s goals. There are three slots, and some blocks in each world. Only 
the Move operator is available and it costs 2. 
5.41.1. Specification of constraints 
An important requirement for the success of the procedure is that each agent identify 
and declare only the absolutely necessary constraints needed for its individual plan to 
succeed. As an example consider the first scenario in Fig. 6. Two agents want to achieve 
thefollowinggoals:gl ={A(l,a),C(1)}and~~={0(3,2),A(2,b)}.Thesetwogoals 
can co-exist, as shown in the final goal state. To achieve his goal aI need not take any 
action. az, on the other hand, has to follow (M(2,~),M(3,2),M(2,b),M(3,b)).‘~ 
The only way for the second step of this plan to be completed is by stacking either 
block 3 or block 2 onto block 1. Although neither of these operations has to do with a2’s 
final goal, by including either of these alternatives as one of its constraints, a2 would 
encounter al’s opposition, thus (perhaps) preventing his own goal from being achieved. 
However, by realizing that the purpose of the second Move operator is just to achieve 
A (3,6), the danger of conflict may be avoided. Thus, if a2 declares his set of constraints 
to be [CC211 U [C(2),C(3)1 U [C(2),C(3),A(3,b)l U [C(2),C(3),A(Zb)l U 
” The first letter denotes the full operator predicate, and I: denotes any location excluding y’s, 
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[A(2,6) ,0(3,2) 1, no conflict arises. At any step, al’s declaration equals his full goal’s 
description. Therefore, at the third step of the procedure, the aggregated set of constraints 
would become [C(2),C(3),A(3,6),C(l),A(l,a)], which is fully satisfied by the 
state {A ( 1, a), A( 2, b) , A( 3, c) }. This state is one step distant from the goal state. The 
described goal state will thus be generated at the next step. Note that A( 2,6), which 
Q’S plan achieves after the first step, is not required for further progress, and therefore 
should not be included in the set of constraints at all. Conflict was avoided because the 
duration of the temporary conflict between the two agents’ plans was short enough to 
be resolved by invoking one more operator. 
5.4.2. Aggregation of temporary constraints 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. In the second scenario, al ‘s goal is the same, 
but ax’s goal is now {0(5,4),0(3,2),A(2,b),A(4,b)}. As in the previous example, 
there is no way for him to achieve his goal without trying to temporarily violate al’s 
goal. But in contrast to that example, there is no way to specify ~2’s constraints in a 
way that would hide the conflict. Here, for example, A( 2,6), although temporary, is 
crucial for a2’s plan’s success. Were the process to consider sets of constraints to be 
relevant only as long as they were consistent, the process might stop after two steps, 
avoiding the goal state from even being considered. 
It is therefore necessary that temporary conflicts between agents’ plans not cause dead- 
locks (that is, if there is a temporal order that can later resolve them). This phenomenon 
is achieved by allowing the existence of semi-consistent sets of constraints, and allowing 
voting over the virtual states that they induce. For that reason, agents should recognize 
what their temporary constraints are (terms that will be violated by their own future 
actions). Identifying the temporary constraints of his own plan, ag’s set of constraints 
(Z2) would then become: ” [C(2)] U [C(2),A(2,b)] U [A(2,6),C(4>,A(3,%)] U 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
[A(2,i!~),C(4>,A(3,%),C(5),A(5,4b),C(2),A(4,~)1 U [A(3,%),C(2),A(‘$b), 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
A(L 
As can be seen in this specification, all the constraints that contradict al’s goal are 
temporary. Therefore, even though ~2’s plan actually violates al’s goal, the mutual goal 
state is reachable. Since all first eight sets of combined constraints (in the first eight 
steps) are semi-consistent, they are taken into account and voted on. In addition, since 
all the induced virtual states are of increasing value (al is always satisfied with his goal 
not being violated, and a2 gets closer to his own goal), the sets are not pruned. Thus, 
the process continues, leading in the ninth step to the (real) mutual goal state. 
5.4.3. Aggregation of functional constraints 
The generation of consensus sets of constraints is based on the aggregation of the 
individual sets of constraints. As the third example in Fig. 6 shows, this is not always 
trivial. Here, there is a ceiling that makes it impossible for more than two blocks to be 
stacked. This time al’s goal is A( 1, b) while gz = A (4, b) . We assume that the function 
” Remember that we use typewriter style to denote temporary constraints. 
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B(b) returns the available free space (in number of blocks) left at slot b. As in any 
scenario, SO satisfies 1) of both agents. ‘s Following the second step of their plans, each 
of the agents has as temporary constraints f s (b) 3 I and C(X), where x is the block 
each wants to move onto slot b. These constraints enable each agent to move “his” 
block to slot b after removing block 2. 
The aggregation of these constraints requires careful analysis. First, it must be rec- 
ognized when the aggregated constraints of two identical terms such as fi( x) > 1 will 
be fs(x) > 2, or simply fi(x) > 1. Had block 4 been located on block 1 in the initial 
state of our example, the first solution would be appropriate. Following it in the given 
scenario, however, would yield the aggregated set of constraints in the second step to 
be [C ( 1) , C (4) ,fs( b) > 21. The induced states of this set cost 10 move operators, 
while the actual plan that achieves the mutual goal costs only 5. The problem here is 
that both constraints are temporary (each agent needs a free space for one block only 
momentarily). Thus, in this case, the aggregated free space should stay 1, leading to a 
state which is only three moue steps distant from the initial state. Unfortunately, it is not 
clear how in general this subtle analysis is to be done (see [ 51 for further discussion 
on the difficulty of handling functional constraints). 
5.4.4. Worth evaluation of sets of constraints 
The process also counts on the fact that the agents’ worth functions increase mono- 
tonically with the number of satisfied constraints (within the maximal gap bound 6). 
This requirement yields the non-decreasing value of the extended set of constraints. 
Thus, the pruning of unpromising states is enabled. However, the fact that the individual 
worth functions monotonically increase may sometimes lead to counter-intuitive results. 
Consider again the last example. Each agent can achieve his own goal by two Move 
steps, whereas to achieve both goals it takes five. Therefore, as long as the cost of a 
multiagent Move is not less than + of a single agent Move, SO will be the optimal state 
using our social welfare criterion. 
5.5. Using the procedure on our example 
We now follow the iterative Clarke tax procedure to solve the first problem presented 
in Section 2.2. We assume that the cost of reaching a state is divided equally among the 
agents (by side payments if necessary), and that each agent i uses the (strictly progres- 
sive) worth function wi(s) = w;(g;) - C(i, s + gi). From the agents’ individual plans, 
we get the following constraints. As before, the first letter denotes the full predicate, j 
denotes any location excluding y’s, and temporary constraints are written in typewriter 
style. I9 
‘*I’ = [C(l),C(2),fs(c) > I.1 and Ii = [C(4),C(2),fs(a) > I]. Note that by its nature the free 
spaie constraint is temporary, since it always is a precondition of an action that violates it! 
” (11 ‘S plan is (Move( 2, I ), Move( 4.3)). The first operation may be invoked if the constraint C (2) is satisfied. 
This constraint is satisfied by sn, and therefore is included in 1:. C(4) is needed for a future operator, but 
it is also satisfied by so, and therefore it too is included in I(. The first operator establishes the constraint 
A(2,b). which is necessary at all future times for the plan to succeed, so it is included in any future set of 
constraints. 
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Fig. 7. Induced states of the five steps. 
b =[C(2),C(4)1(=1~) u [C(4)+4(2,b)1(=1$ 
U [A(4,c),At(2,b)l(=I:), 
Iz= [C(2),C(4)1 U [C(4),C(2),C(5)1 U ]C(2),C(5),0(2,4)i 
u [0(2,4),0(5,2)1, 
13= [C(2)] U [C(2),C(3)1 U [C(2),C(3),A(3,E)] 
U [C(~),C(~),A(~,C)I U [A(2,c),0(3,2)1. 
Fig. 7 presents the induced states at each step (in this example, all the generated 
states are real). At the first step, each agent declares Zi. 6’) the set that includes all 
possible consensus sets of constraints, has only one member: Gi = { [ C( 2), C( 4) ] }. 
s( Cl) also has only one member, se. Agents then vote on this state, and it receives 
a score of 6 (for example, a2 goal’s worth is 14, and to achieve it the agent would 
perform (M(4,E),M(2,4),M(5,2)) at a cost of 12; therefore, he values SO as 2). The 
normalized value is (by definition) 0. 
At the second step, each agent hands in 1: (which is in fOn,,,,(Gi) for each i). Since 
all these constraints co-exist consistently, E2 = G! U [ C (2)) C (4), C (5), C (3), A (2, b) ] . 
This set induces the single state st (= s(G:)) as described in Fig. 7. Note that there 
are many other states that could satisfy this set of constraints, but st has the minimal 
cost. This state can be achieved by (Move(4, a), Move( 2,1)); therefore, the state costs 
6. Subtracting this cost from the normalized worth values given by each agent (4 in this 
case by all three agents), the state scores 6. Since this score is greater than that of the 
preceding state se, the process continues. 
At the third step, the new added constraints generate 3 possible maximally con- 
sistent extensions: G: = [A(~,~),A(~,c),C(~),C(~),C(~),A(~,Z)] inducing ~2, 
Gz = [0(2,4),A(2,b),C(2),C(5),C(3),A(3,Z)] inducing ss, and Gz = [0(2,4), 
A(~,c),C(~),C(~),C(~),A(~,E)] inducing s4 and ss. These induced states respec- 
tively score 11, 3, 12, and 12; G$, which decreases the social utility, is therefore 
pruned. 
At the fourth step, the two remaining extensions are extended further; al hands in 
{A(2,b),A(4,c)} ( h’ h w rc is in fon,,(G~)), a2 hands in {0(2,4), 0(5,2)} and as 
in { C( 3)) C( 2)) A(2, c)} (both in fo[low( Gi)). These constraints yield six different 
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Fig. X. The entire search tree 
<I, 2 5 -7 0 0 -II -5 -5 4 6 IO *I2 *I2 6 IO IO 0 
(I> 2 I 5 4 ‘4 c) 7 -I 4 *IO -2 8 8 -14 -2 6 2 
(13 2 5 5 x 8 -3 3 I I 1 *6 -2 4 4 -2 2 -6 2 
SUN, (, I I 3 * I2 * I2 -5 5 5 4 
Fig. 9. Cumulative voting using the Clarke tax mechanism. 
extensions that again induce the states ~1, sj, XL s5 and the new states $j and s7 (that 
score respectively -5 and 5). Therefore. only the sets that induce s4 and ss can be 
further extended (by us) to induce ss. Although ss fully satisfies us’s goal, it scores 
only 5 and the process ends. 
Fig. 8 shows the entire search tree. 
All intermediate votes are now gathered for the linal vote, which employs the Clarke 
mechanism as described in Fig. 9. The format of the table follows the one given in 
Section 2.4. Each row of the table shows several pieces of information regarding an 
agent. First, his preferences for each state are listed. Then, the total score that each state 
would have received, had the agent not voted, are listed. An asterisk marks the winning 
choice in each situation. 
As can be seen from the table, both SJ and s5 maximize the social welfare utility 
(both are one operation distant from each of the agents’ goals). Both a2 and u3 are 
taxed 2. u2 improves its utility by 2 and a3 by 6 (al’s utility is not improved with 
respect to SO). The group’s social utility is therefore improved by 8. 
5.6. Power and injuence among heterogeneous agents 
Up to now, we have assumed that all agents have equal capabilities and use an identical 
evaluation function. This is, however, not the typical real-world situation. Assume, for 
example, that ai is an older model agent and it’s harder for him to carry a block; thus 
the operator Move( 06ji , 06j2) has cost for al of 6 instead of 4. His worth assessment 
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for so will thus become 0, and his entire set of normalized preferences is changed to 
be (4,9, -9,2,2, -15, -5, -5). This vote causes the chosen state to be s2 with a score 
of 15. ai pays a tax of 6 for a state that he values as 9, and thus his own utility 
is improved by 3 (9 - 6) ; in the original scenario his utility was not improved at 
all. 
On the other hand, uz and a3 improve their utilities by 1 and 5 respectively, while in 
the original scenario their utilities were improved by 2 and 6 respectively. Interestingly, 
the overall social utility actually increases in this case, and although achieving his goal 
alone would leave him with 0 utility, ai gains from the group activity. Notice, however, 
that ni cannot gain any profit by pretending to be disabled since his true preferences 
stay as before. If he changed the outcome by insincere voting as above, he would end 
up paying a tax of 6 for a state that he really values at 5. 
The same phenomenon may be caused for a totally different reason. al’s goal’s worth 
is 12. However, this relatively high worth is not expressed in the worth assessment 
functions that we assumed to be used by the three agents (because the functions are 
normalized). ui would rather use the following evaluation function: 
Wi(S) =-Ci(sO + s) + Wi(gi) x [~(P(Q3sO ~~i))l/[~(~(~i~~ *&?i))l* 
Using this function his vote will again be changed to be (4,9, -9,2,2, -15, -5, -5): 
yielding the same outcome as above. In fact, by using any worth assessment function 
that “spreads” the worth of the goal over progress towards its achievement, we have that 
the higher wi(gi) is, the more agent i influences the group. 
Fortunately, the influence of an agent on the social decision may be easily controlled 
without losing the power of the mechanism as an effective preference revealer [35] 
(of course by assigning weights to agents we lose the possibility of anonymity). This 
control may be achieved by giving an influence weight zi (E Rf) to each agent ai. 
Given ai’s normalized preferences Vi, each Ui( Sk) is divided by zi; only then is the choice 
function invoked. Then, in order to keep truth as the dominant strategy, the calculated 
tax (according to the weighted votes) is multiplied by zi. 
Lemma 3 (due to I.J. Good). Even when influence weights are used along with agent 
preferences, it is still agent i’s best strategy, at each step k of the procedure, to vote 
over the alternatives at that step (Sk) according to his true normalized preferences Vi 
(that is, subtracting wi ( SO) from wi ( S) for any s). 
As an example, consider again the vote in Fig. 9. If it is desired that ~22’s influence on 
the voting process be four times greater relative to the others (22 = 4)) then instead of 
his original vote we get (8,4,20, 16,16,36,28, -4). The score of the states will become 
(12,14,18,24,24,22,26,2), which yields the selection of s7 (that fully satisfies ~2’s 
goal). ~22’s apparent tax becomes 12, but he will actually be taxed 3 (= 12/4). us will 
pay a tax of 2, and al a tax of 0; the social utility will therefore decrease to 4. Setting 
zi to be i can serve to solve the problem that was described in the first example of this 
section, where we might wish to perturb the influence that agents have on the decision 
procedure, such as when their capabilities (or the costs they associate with actions) are 
different. 
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5.7. Heuristic pruning of the search 
Although superior to the centralized process, the dynamic search process from Sec- 
tion 5.3 is very complex. Our primary concern has been the finding of all states that 
may be in consensus, rather than the complexity of finding all of them. However, if we 
relax this demand, and are satisfied with only one state, or with states that are “close” to 
the actual consensus states, the complexity of the process may be reduced significantly. 
One way is to guide the search by using the actual A* algorithm. With this approach, 
the evaluation of each alternative state will be as before. However, at each iterative 
step of extension in the algorithm (step 1) we choose for further extension only the 
most promising state according to the evaluation function (f’ = g + h’). Note that if 
the heuristic evaluation is accurate, then a consensus state will be found after at most 
O(max,Esw(s) 1( P( SO + s) )) steps, where at each step only one set of aggregated 
constraints is being extended. However, since subplans will tend to interfere with one 
another (both in “positive” ways [overlapping constraints], and in “negative” ways 
[conflicting constraints], similar to what are called positive and negative threats in 
POCL planning [57]) we must search further so as to overcome the misjudgment 
of the heuristic function, or be satisfied with the first state reached, which may be 
suboptimal. 
Another computationally expensive component of each step is the generation of the 
actual optimal plan that derives each intermediate state (s). Here again, we may relax 
the demand for optimality and consider the plan that is induced by the aggregated set to 
be the optimal one. Following this approach in the example shown in Section 5.5, the 
cost of deriving the final consensus state would become 21 instead of 15 (seven Move 
operators instead of just five). 
Another way of reducing complexity in determining the optimal plan at each in- 
termediate state is to exploit the computational power of participating agents. With 
this approach, each agent is assigned a subgoal that corresponds to his “contribution” 
to the state in question .ri (such that Ai si b s). The agents then follow a variant 
of the main algorithm so as to derive the plan that generates the state. In the ex- 
ample, the division into subgoals of the final state would become: s’ = (A(4, c)}, 
s* = {A(2,~),0(2,4),C(5)}, s3 = {A(3,c),0(3,2)}. Note that in this case, there is 
no need to consider semi-consistent sets of aggregated constraints (and their correspond- 
ing virtual states) since all subgoals are coherent. For that same reason, the heuristic 
evaluation is much more accurate. 
Following this approach, the actual multiagent plan may be constructed during the 
process itself. The construction may be made at step 1 of the algorithm. Each agent 
bids for each action that each extension implies. The bid is based on the sequence of i’s 
previous actions in the extended set. Thus, the minimal cost sequence may be determined 
(to ensure honest bidding it is possible to employ the Vickrey mechanism [90] ). 
Yet another way to prune the search process is to define a dominance relation over 
alternative extensions at each step, and ignore dominated extensions. An example might 
be to prefer an extension that satisfies in full the declaration of one agent, over one 
that only partially satisfies two different declarations. Or, given an aggregated set A, we 
may prefer its extension E that induces a grounded constraint I over another extension 
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True worth of each schedule 
SI s2 SJ s4 
Sum for each schedule without i
$1 s2 33 s4 
Tax for i Utility for i 
al 3 3 -5 11 14 *41 -2 22 0 3 
a2 10 16 0 2 7 28 -7 *31 3 13 
(13 -4 20 -8 16 21 *24 I 17 0 20 
a4 8 5 6 4 9 *39 -13 29 0 5 
SW1 17 *44 -7 33 3 41 
Fig. 10. The standard Clarke tax mechanism. 
i? that induces a grounded constraint 1 (such that I A 1 + False) if I E A while 1 $Z A 
or if f appears in some agent’s final goal, while I does not (intuitively, we can in this 
way avoid directions in which constraints are added that are merely stumbling blocks). 
Following this heuristic in Example 5.5, states sg and s6 would not be considered since 
they will be dominated by states s2 and s7 respectively. In many cases l? \ 1 would be 
preferable to ,?? itself. Following Example 5.5 again, st will contain {On(4,5)} instead 
of {On(4,a),C(5)}, and the “premature” removal of block 4 will be avoided. 
6. Partial revelation of preferences 
One significant drawback of the CTm (as mentioned above), is the fact that the 
participating agents are expected to calculate and declare their exact and entire set 
of utilities and preferences over the set of alternatives. One of our interests, however, 
might be to reach the right decision, but ensure agents’ privacy as much as possible. 
Below, we introduce iterative variations of the Clarke mechanism that allow agents to 
reach consensus while calculating and revealing only partial information about their 
preferences. 
6.1. An example 
As an example, consider a group of four scheduling agents, attempting to establish a 
schedule of meetings for their owners. The four individuals whose interests the agents 
represent have varying preferences regarding possible schedules. For example, one of the 
individuals very much does not want to meet his supervisor (the individual is unprepared 
for the meeting). However, he would prefer that this preference remain private. 
As shown in Fig. 10, there are fouspossible alternative schedules. The agents have 
preferences over these alternatives. For example, a2 mostly prefers schedule ~2, finds 
st to be a relatively good choice, but is strongly against s3 and ~4. Since the decision 
is to be taken via the Clarke tax, it is in each agent’s best interest to declare its true 
preferences. The table shows how, using the Clarke tax, they settle on schedule ~2, with 
agent a2 paying a tax of 3. 
However, the mechanism has publically uncovered all of the agents’ preferences. It 
may be the case that agents (or their controlling owners) wish to conceal their true 
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evaluations of the various schedules. Although CQ doesn’t want the schedule ~3, for 
example, it doesn’t mean that a3 wants to publically admit that fact. 
This section presents an iterative, dynamic variation of the original mechanism. The 
basic idea is that instead of a “one-shot” voting procedure, the vote takes place as a 
sequence of steps. At each step, a voter can either change the group vote in favor of 
one alternative by a fixed amount 6, or opt out of the process. This method manages to 
preserve the agents’ privacy with regard to preferences as much as possible. In addition, 
if the group can come to a quick consensus, agents do not have to fully explore their 
preferences over other alternatives. The longer the decision takes to make, the more 
refined calculation is needed. 
6.2. Notation 
Here we summarize the notation that we will be using in the procedure specification 
below. Some of it parallels the notation presented above for the embedded stepwise 
Clarke tax mechanism (Section 5.1). 
. 
. 
l 
0 
l 
. 
. 
6.3. 
The function w, : S - R, returns the true worth of each alternative to a;. wi( s?) 
is the worth of the state that i values the least. 
/I[( s) is the value i adds to the state s at round r; di( s) = ~~=, u,‘(s) is the total 
sum given so far by i to alternative s. di denotes the vector (dr ( I ) , dJ( 2) ). . , 
d;(m)). We denote by d[dk t dl] the vector that is created by replacing the kth 
element of the vector d by di. 
The set of preferences declared by all agents at round r is denoted by DL, where 
05, denotes this set excluding i’s preferences, such that 0: = (II!+, di). 
2’(s) = Cy=, dr( s) is the total score of s at step r. 
5’ denotes the choice at round r (i.e., S is the rnuximizer of Y(s) ). 
The tax imposed on i at round r is 
U;(S) = w,(s) -- t:(s) is the utility that i gets from choice s at round r (where t: 
is the tax that is imposed on i with respect to round r). 
The partial revelation voting procedure 
Imagine a voter who is being asked to help choose among three outcomes, A, B, and 
C. His true preferences can be represented by the vector (7,0,13). However, the voting 
procedure is going to protect the secrecy of these preferences as much as possible. Prior 
to the first round, this agent’s “stated” preferences are initialized as (O,O,O). At each 
step, the agent can specify a positive increase in one or more elements in the vector, 
subject to the following restriction: he can attempt to change the current group choice 
to some other outcome by amount 6, and in parallel increase other outcomes (if he 
wishes). Alternatively, the agent can remain silent, or (if his true preferences won’t 
change the group outcome), he can reveal all his preferences and/or opt out of future 
steps. 
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For example, let’s say that at a certain step the group choice appears to be (25,20,23), 
and our agent’s stated preference (so far, from previous rounds) is (2,0,3). Assume 
that 6 = 1. On the next round, our agent can specify the following increase: (O,O, 3) 
and thus try to change the outcome in favor of alternative C by 1. All the agents’ votes 
are combined in a linear sum, and a new choice (for this step) results. 
Formally, the partial revelation voting procedure is defined as follows: 
( I) At step 0 all the preferences for all agents are assumed to equal zero. The choice 
is (arbitrarily) defined to be st . 
(2) At step k, all agents simultaneously vote. Each agent’s vote consists of a vector 
that specifies the positive increase in his preferences. Each agent can either: 
(a) Keep silent. 
(b) Increase its vote for an outcome different than the current choice (5’)) in a 
way that would change the outcome by 6 had he been the only voter. If the 
agent opts to attempt to change the group vote on a particular outcome by 
6, he is allowed to also increase his vote for other alternatives in parallel. 
(c) If the agent’s true preferences will apparently not change the group outcome, 
he may choose not to take part in any subsequent steps of the voting 
procedure, and may or may not choose to reveal his entire set of preferences 
(as he wishes). 
(3) The new choice Sk+’ is taken to be the one that gets the highest score at round k 
(i.e., the choice function f returns {s 1 s E A A s is the maximizer of _YP( s) }) . 
(4) If there is no change in the vote at step k (Sk = S’+’ ), then the process stops, 
and Sk is chosen. 
(5) At all times, each agent must have at least one alternative that is declared to 
have a worth of zero; this effectively normalizes his preferences. 
(6) At the end of the process each agent is fined with the Clarke tax, calculated 
with respect to all the agents’ preferences reached at the last step. Let r be 
the final round; then the tax paid by i after round r will be ti(f(Dh)) = 
C~+idir(f(D~i)) -C~+idj(f(Diivdi)). 
Below, we will prove certain properties about this iterated voting procedure. First, 
however, we state a useful lemma, that an agent’s best strategy in voting with this 
procedure is to consistently maintain a balanced distance between his own vote and his 
true preferences, for every outcome (for which this is possible). So, for example, if his 
true preferences are (7,0,13), and he is increasing his C vote to sum to 9, his A vote 
should in parallel be increased to sum to 3. 
Lemma 4. Let or denote i’s declared preferences at round r, such that for each r, 
there is a constant 0; with the following property: for each alternative state s, the 
true worth of the state differs from a:(s) by that constant. The dominant strategy for 
voting in the iterative procedure above is to always choose such a a: that maintains 
that constant relationship with the agent’s true preferences. 
63.1. Observations on the optimal voting strategy 
Let 3; denote the alternative that maximizes ai’s utility and let Ai = 2’( 51) - Y( s?[) + 
8; this is the amount needed to change the social choice from the current choice to 
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an agent’s own choice (Sy). In effect, J?I is the maximizer of ui(f( DLj, dI[dk +- 
(dJ( k) + d;) ] ) ). It is evident from the proof of the above lemma and requirement (5) 
of the procedure, that i’s vote for any alternative s cannot exceed w;(s) - wi(sy). 
Combined with the constraint that the agent can only increase its vote for each outcome 
at most by A: (requirement (2b) of the procedure) yields i’s best response at round r 
to be: 
(a) If $ = J”, keep silent (the current choice maximizes i’s utility), else if wi( 2:) - 
I.L~;(s~‘~“) < dr(.?:) +dr, then u:(S’:) = ~v;(s’r) - w;(sy”) -dr(s^:) (i reaches the 
“ceiling” of his preferences and must opt out) else ok = A[ (i.e., &change 
the vote in favor of SF within the limitations of the voting procedure). Note that 
the agent cannot get a “free ride” by keeping silent, since if someone else is 
going to carry out the job for him, his tax will decrease to zero in any case. 
(b) Let 0: = d;($j) + A; - d:(k) - ~~(3;). Then for each k # ?r, u;(k) = 
max[O, wi( k) + Or] (i.e., update his vote to most adequately reflect his true 
preferences with respect to s^F within the limitations imposed by the voting 
procedure). 
We now state certain properties about the iterated voting procedure presented above: 
Theorem 5. The partial revelation voting procedure has the following properties: 
( I ) The chosen alternative is identical to the one chosen under the regular CTm, 
within S (i.e., if two choices differ by less than 6, the wrong one may be chosen). 
(2) On the average, agents have to reveal less information than in the original setting, 
and those who are indifferent between alternatives reveal their preferences before 
those who assign greatly different values to alternatives. In addition, the “amount 
of information” needed is inversely proportional to the identity of preferences held 
by the agents (i.e., the closer the agents are to one another’s preferences, the 
less needs to be revealed). 
(3) Each agent has a maximum “spread’ between alternatives with highest and 
lowest worth. Call the largest such spread among the group of voters Q. The 
process will stop after at most Q/8 + I rounds. 
6.4. Running the procedure on our example 
The table in Fig. 11 shows how the process works for the scheduling agents described 
in Section 6. I. 
At the first round, the choice is set arbitrarily to be SO. No tax is to be paid by 
any agent, and therefore each agent i gets a utility of \vi( ~1). Besides a4 (who keeps 
silent), all other agents prefer to pay 6(= 2) in order to change the group’s vote to 
be their favorite choice. Since both a2 and a3 prefer ~2, s2 wins the highest score and 
becomes the choice at round 1. Now only al and a4 are motivated to bring about a 
change. To change the outcome of the vote, the score of any competing alternative must 
reach 6. Therefore, al increases his vote for s4 by 4. ad, on the other hand, cannot vote 
more than 4 for ~1, and therefore opts out and reveals his entire (normalized) set of 
preferences. Thus, at round 2, the choice is s4 where al is to be taxed by 5 (for a state 
that he values 11). At the third round, both a2 and a3 increase their votes for s2 by 
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r i W(Q) or -d,‘(Q) t; u; 
(sr(sk)) SI s2 s3 s4 Sl s2 s3 s4 
a1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
(12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 
r=O (13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -4 
(14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
slit?* *0 0 0 0 0 17 
(1 I 0 0 0 2 0 *4 0 0 0 3 
(12 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 16 
I’= I (13 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 20 
(U 0 0 0 0 0 *4 0 2 0 5 
sum 0 *4 0 2 0 44 
aI 0 0 0 6 4 *5 2 0 5 6 
(12 0 2 0 0 4 3 2 *6 0 2 
r=2 a? 0 2 0 0 4 3 2 *6 0 16 
a4 4 1 2 0 0 4 0 *6 0 4 
SW?l 4 5 2 *6 5 28 
aI 0 0 0 6 4 *II 2 2 0 3 
a2 0 5 0 0 4 6 2 *I 1 15 
r = 3(4) (12 0 5 0 1 4 6 2 6 0 20 
a4 4 1 2 0 0 *IO 0 I 0 5 
SUl?l 4 *II 2 7 1 43 
Fig. I 1. Iterative steps towards a consensus. 
3(= 6 - 5 + 2), and the group choice turns out to be ~2. Since no agent can improve its 
utility by changing his vote (though al prefers outcome s4 [as can be seen in Fig. 10 
above], he doesn’t prefer it enough to change the overall group vote) the process ends; 
at round 4 everybody keeps silent. Notice that only a4 (who is almost indifferent) ended 
up revealing (at round 2) his entire (normalized) set of preferences. All other agents 
have maintained some privacy. For example, as and ~24 will never know that u2 had 
significantly preferred sr over sg and ~4. 
6.5. Determining 6 
For the vote to give an accurate result, 6 should be small enough to allow each 
agent to express his preferences, i.e., 6 should be less than or equal to the minimal 
difference between any agent’s preferences: 6 = mins,&S,ied IWi( S) - Wi( k) I. One way 
of determining a good 8 is the following: at step -1, before the voting commences, 
each agent declares the S he prefers, and the minimal value is chosen. An agent has no 
reason to lie, since a too small S wastes time, and a too big one destroys his influence. 
To make convergence to a solution more efficient, the value of S can also be de- 
termined dynamically. At each step, each agent who is not opting out can determine 
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the 6 that he would like to use, and the system-wide 6 will be the minimal of all 
agents’ 6’s. In this process, each agent’s best suggestion at round r > 1 is to let Sy be 
mink, w,(k) - wi( k’) where k is the minimizer of {dr( k) / df( k) > 0) and at round 1 
let 6 equal the gap between his most preferred choice and his second preferred one. In 
the example we get: 8; = 8, Si = 6, Si = 4 and St = 2, and therefore 6’ = 2. 
7. Coalitions 
As with most other voting procedures, the original CTm is sensitive to coalitions [ 841. 
In other words, the attributes of the mechanism (such as the important fact that telling 
the truth is the dominant strategy) are not maintained when agents can enter into 
agreements before the vote is taken. So when a subset of agents collude, they can 
exploit the process, getting the outcome they want without having to pay for it. 
As an example consider two agents that would rather have some alternative Y be 
chosen instead of X. To accomplish this, each of the agents could overbid Y’s worth 
such that his declaration alone would be sufficient to make Y be the chosen alternative. 
This way (assuming that the agents know the sufficient value and are not facing any 
other coalition) Y will be chosen with none of the agents having to pay any tax (since 
neither agent alone caused Y to be chosen, which is the condition upon which a tax is 
levied). In the general case, the larger their distortion is, the surer they are of forcing 
their preferred social decision, but the more risk they must accept if their assumptions 
about the others’ votes proves erroneous. 
More specifically, consider the vote described in Fig. 2. a2 and a4 caused their 
favorable state ($3 1 to be chosen, but are fined with a tax. If both agree before the vote 
and declare (for instance) d2 = (-45, 12,33), d4 = (-24,-15,39), s3 is still chosen, 
but both agents avoid any tax payment. 
Even worse, consider another possible coalition that might form. Both al and a5 
prefer st over the chosen ~3. If they come to a pre-vote agreement, they might both 
declare dl = (69, -33, -36) and d2 = (86,2, -88) and guarantee the group choice of 
si (instead of Q), without paying any tax. 
Such crafty schemes may be easily dealt with if the formation of coalitions is known 
a priori, since by treating each coalition as a single agent, truth telling remains each 
coalition’s dominant strategy. But if formation of coalitions may occur secretly, the 
danger of the process being manipulated by these coalitions always exists in Clarke tax 
mechanisms. 
Unfortunately, it was proven in (3,371, that there exists no successful preference 
revelation mechanism (i.e., such that truth telling is each agent’s dominant strategy and 
the ultimate choice of the group is the one that maximizes the social welfare) that is 
immune to coalitions. Moreover, even if the size of possible coalitions is limited to 
equal some fixed 1 < c < n, no such mechanism exists. On the other hand, for a fixed 
coalition, the expected gain from cheating, as compared to telling the truth, decreases 
with the number of agents in the population. And if the population is taken to be a 
random sample in a fixed distribution, the probability that a cheating coalition of size 
< fi will gain any fixed positive utility approaches zero as the sample size grows [ 371. 
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Thus, the sensitivity of the mechanism to coalitions cannot be handled without some 
loss in optimality. One way is to limit the magnitude of bids allowable to each agent 
such that they will not exceed a predefined limit. The risk of such a limitation, of course, 
is that it might force an agent to understate his true preferences. It might at times be 
reasonable to set the limit based on the agent’s declared goal, for example, setting the 
limit to be no more than C ( SO @ Sk). But again, this might tempt the agent to declare 
a more expensive goal (although such dishonesty might be tracked by later observing 
his actual bids). 
Another way is to charge a tax on winners (i.e., agents whose desired outcomes were 
chosen by the group) who would otherwise, in the regular CTm, not pay any tax (this 
will cause a deviation from the optimal equilibrium). Let A, denote the set of agents 
whose highest bid was chosen, and who ended up not having to pay any tax. For each 
agent ai in this group, we then calculate his tax by the profile ( IDYai, D,) (the vote with 
ai but without the other members of A,,,). Using this additional tax mechanism, agents 
might still form coalitions to reduce their own tax, but such coalitions will not alter 
the chosen state. Although by telling the truth each member of this group is guaranteed 
to pay less than the utility he gains from the chosen state, it is possible to reduce this 
tax in proportion to the portion of members of A, in the voting society (for example 
multiplying the tax by 1 - IA,l/N). 
7.1. Coalitions in the partial revelation voting procedure 
As with the original CTm, our iterative voting procedure is also sensitive to coali- 
tions: two or more agents could act in a coordinated way so that neither has to pay any 
tax. In certain ways, the iterated procedure can be exploited by coalitions even more 
easily than the original Clarke tax, because there is a built-in mechanism for coordi- 
nating moves with your partner: keep cooperatively altering the outcome to be your 
choice, and there’s no tax (in the original Clarke tax, agents would need both to set 
up their own coordination prior to voting, and second-guess the votes of non-coalition 
members). 
We can alter the simultaneous iterative procedure so that it is done sequentially, one 
agent voting after the other, with otherwise the same rules as those given above. In this 
case, the procedure is immune to coalitions, because there can be only one agent who 
is causing the change in outcome (i.e., not two or more agents simultaneously). The 
agent that changes the outcome, and he alone, will pay the tax. 
However, there is a problem with the procedure, the recurrent “free rider problem” 
that was mentioned above. An agent may be tempted not to vote honestly so that he 
won’t be the one to pay the tax, in the hope that some other agent will still (later) cause 
the original agent’s most preferred outcome to be chosen. If an agent counts on someone 
after him changing the outcome, and that doesn’t happen, then the “incorrect” (non- 
optimal) choice may be made by the group. The possibility of an incorrect outcome, 
however, only occurs when agents act on possibly incorrect beliefs-when they restrict 
themselves to acting on definite knowledge about other agents, the correct outcome will 
result from the voting procedure (though agents still get free rides). This sequential 
iterative procedure thus guarantees that as long as an agent operates relative only to his 
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definite knowledge about the other agents, the correct outcome will be chosen and no 
coalition can manipulate it. 
8. Related work 
In other research, we have considered related issues of how to use the Clarke tax 
mechanism in automated systems. In [21] we explored how to distribute the voting 
mechanism so that it no longer requires a central vote counter. In [ 181 we considered 
the issue of how to use the tax that is collected (which cannot be used for the benefit 
of the voters themselves), and how to distribute the workload of a global plan among 
the agents. In [ 171 we analyzed how standard cryptographic techniques can be used as 
another means to maintain privacy regarding agent preferences. All of this work makes 
fundamental use of voting theory and economic mechanisms. A survey of relevant issues 
can be found in [ 4 1,54,68,84]. 
Although the use of (economic) voting mechanisms to derive consensus in multiagent 
systems is novel within artificial intelligence, the issues of reaching consensus, and 
in a broader sense coordination, in multiagent environments, is the main concern of 
researchers in distributed artificial intelligence. In this section we briefly review some 
of the most relevant work from that field. 
Most of the DA1 work on solving problems of coordination has been carried out by 
researchers within the area of distributedproblem solving (DPS) . One common approach 
is to use a central coordinator. This approach includes centralized planning, where one 
central agent generates the global plan and then hands out pieces of that plan to be 
performed by the participating agents [ 9,48,67,69]. Within this centralized approach, 
some work falls within the category of synchronization of pre-existing plans [ 29,301. 
The assumption there is that individual plans are first created, and then submitted to a 
central planner that is responsible for coordination. In [ 491 a fast probabilistic approach 
to solving this kind of coordination is suggested. 
There are many methods for relaxing these centralized solutions to coordination. 
One common way is to have some hierarchy of coordinating agents, such that each 
agent is responsible for the coordination of those who are below it in the hierarchy. 
Coordination is then done through some communication process. One approach that 
uses this hierarchical technique is that of partial global plans [ 13,141. Within this 
framework, the group’s activity is modeled as a network and there is a distinction 
between three hierarchical types of plans (information nodes). Climbing the hierarchy, 
each node has a more global and long term perspective on the multiagent activity. Some 
other approaches allow the hierarchy to be dynamically changed, as in [ 831. 
The underlying working assumption of the DPS paradigm, that the agents inhabiting 
the multiagent environment are centrally designed, also gave rise to some frameworks 
that impose coordination as an integral part of the environment. A notable member of 
this class is the work on artificial social systems [62] that was inspired by the multi- 
entity [ 611 model. It uses the society metaphor to design robots that are to operate in 
a loosely coupled fashion. A formal definition and basic semantics for artificial social 
systems were presented. This model was augmented with a set of restrictions on agents’ 
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actions to define the actions that an agent may “legally” perform. This concept gave rise 
to the term social laws which was introduced in [ 781. A set of social laws is meant 
to enable efficient interaction among agents that adhere to them. In [78] the usefulness 
of social traffic laws within the domain of mobile robots was illustrated. The main 
research assumed that social laws are being generated off-line (i.e., prior to the actual 
interaction) and that the participating agents are to (benevolently) obey the given laws. 
In more recent work, the idea of dynamic emergence of such laws is discussed [79]. 
Note the difference between this work on social laws, and the mechanism design that 
we’ve been exploring in this article. The research on social laws concerns itself with 
the public behavior of agents, and not at all with the private preferences held by these 
agents. It is assumed that the desired public behavior can be directly imposed on the 
agents. 
Another approach taken is to establish cooperation through the formalization of agents’ 
intentions. Agents have to take their beliefs and intentions into consideration as they 
collaboratively plan [ 38,391. The collaborative agents build full plans from partial plans 
that they can alter dynamically over time. 
Closer to our approach are frameworks that explicitly address the need for agents 
to reach an agreement or consensus. Typically, consensus is reached through a pro- 
cess of goal revelation and information exchange, loosely categorized under the label 
negotiation [8,13,51,70,87]. 
As an example, the PERSUADER system [ 86,871 uses negotiation to find a compro- 
mise that is acceptable to the agents in conflict. Their goals might not be totally satisfied 
by the final agreement. The negotiation process can be seen as a search in a dynamic 
space consisting of the agents’ beliefs about other agents’ beliefs. This space changes 
dynamically as the agents’ proposals are revealed. 
Another example is the multi-fireboss phoenix system [60]. Planning (the actions 
needed to assess and contain fires) is performed by several spatially distributed agents. 
The system addresses, through a sophisticated negotiation protocol, the dynamic alloca- 
tion of resources. ‘O 
Less work has been done within DAI on the subject of reaching a consensus in the 
context of multiagent systems (MAS). One approach has been to use negotiation in the 
sense of game theory and (more specifically) bargaining theory [ 43,55,65,73,74,92]. 
One game-theoretic method for coordinating the activities of autonomous agents, 
within MAS, is the recursive modeling method [341. Each agent models the other agents 
in a recursive manner and thus acquires probabilistic knowledge about the expected 
utility values that the other agents have about their preferences, abilities, and the world. 
Each agent looks for an action that will maximize its individual utility, by estimating 
the others’ expected utility values. The uncertainties are represented as probabilistic 
distributions. 
*O Our approach would solve this problem in a direct manner, without negotiation. At each time interval, the 
agents would vote over the possible relevant distributions (one step of the algorithm per time interval). Given 
the individual utilities, the accurate distribution of resources would be chosen that maximizes the social utility 
(minimizes the damage according to the group’s perspective). In addition, there is no need to assume that the 
agents are benevolent. 
An alternative game-theoretic model, in which time is taken into consideration, appears 
in 1531. In general, the agents have a common goal to achieve. Each wants to do as little 
as possible to help carry out this goal. The agents are assumed to have full information, 
to be rational, and to commit themselves to the agreements they have reached. The set of 
all possible agreements is assumed to exist and to include all the pairs of work sharing 
that will satisfy a goal. 
Another approach to handling negotiation in MAS has been explored in [ 7 1 I. Within 
this framework, agents converge to a single choice in a so-called negotiation set. This 
negotiation set is the group of all agreements that exhibit the properties of positive utility 
for all agents, and pareto optimality. 
The disadvantage of these classic approaches to negotiation, compared with our ap- 
proach, is that they place a large computational burden on the negotiating agents. The 
agents must compute all the elements in the negotiation set, a computation which may 
be non-trivial. All agents must also have sufficient information about one another’s 
preferences in order to compute the negotiation set. Agents need to consider all their 
and their opponents’ possible strategies to determine their best response. And, finally, 
much of the work on negotiation has treated only two-agent consensus. Since, given 
the agents’ preferences and the optimality criterion, determining the optimal choice is a 
matter of direct computation, the substantive role of the negotiation process is to reveal 
pret’crences. Our method for uncovering the true preferences of agents does away with 
the need for this kind of negotiation. 
Another way of bypassing negotiation, and one that is quite similar to our own ap- 
proach, is to use market-like mechanisms. There have been several attempts, both inside 
of artificial intelligence and outside, to consider market mechanisms as a way of reveal- 
ing agents’ true preferences (and thus efficiently allocate resources). Notable among 
the AI work is that of Smith’s contract net [ 82,831, Malone’s enterprise system [ 561, 
the work of Miller and Drexler on agoric open systems [59], and Wellman’s WALRAS 
system [91]. 
The contract net is a high-level communication protocol for a distributed problem 
solving system. Its aim is to facilitate the distribution of the tasks among the processors 
(nodes) that operate in the system. The collection of nodes is itself the contract net. A 
contract between two nodes is established so that tasks can be executed. Each node in 
the net can act either as a manager or as a contractor. A task that has been assigned to a 
node in the net can be further decomposed by the contractor. An agent can be a manager 
for one task and he can execute another task as a contractor, even simultaneously. A 
contract is established by a bidding scheme that includes the announcement of the 
potential manager and the bids sent by the potential contractors. A recent formalization 
of the bidding and awarding decision process that was originally described informally 
appears in [ 751, where the formalization is based on marginal cost calculation according 
to local agent criteria. 
Enterprise is a system that was built using a variation of this protocol. The protocol 
is used to schedule tasks among different processors that are connected in a local area 
network. The personal workstations are dedicated to their owners but while idle, they 
serve as general purpose machines. The distriLmted scheduling protocol is used to locate 
the best available machine to perform a task. This protocol is similar to that of the 
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contract net. The main difference is in the (more well-defined) assignment criteria. 
In Enterprise, the contractors select the tasks, announced by the managers, according 
to the task’s priority, and the managers select their contractors according to the time 
completion estimates of the contractors. 
The concept of contracts was also used in [50]. One agent will have a contract 
with another when it wants some of its tasks to be done by the other. It might be the 
case that the first agent cannot perform his task, or that the other can do it better. A 
reward method based on a monetary system to convince agents to accept the contracts is 
used. The mechanism of subcontracting is evaluated according to the simplicity, pareto 
optimality, and stability criteria. 
Another system that takes an economic approach to solve a problem distributed among 
several agents, based on a price mechanism, has been proposed by Wellman [ 9 11. There 
are two types of agents: consumers and producers that buy and sell goods. Producers 
may transform some kind of goods into others according to their production function. 
Each type of agent has an initial allocation of goods. Both types try to maximize their 
utility-consumers try to consume as much as they can, while producers maximize their 
profit. Each distinct good has an auction associated with it. The agents can get the good 
by submitting bids in the auction for that good. These bids specify a correspondence 
between prices and quantities of the good that the agent wants to demand or to supply. 
The market is in equilibrium with respect to some commodity, when the current price 
for that commodity is clearing regarding the current bids. A price is clearing when 
the quantity of the good that has been demanded is balanced by the quantity that has 
been supplied. The system presented there, WALRAS, computes for each market the 
equilibrium price. 
9. Conclusions 
In this article we have presented the Clarke tax mechanism (CTm) as a plausible 
tool for deriving consensus in multiagent systems. The Clarke tax is a voting procedure 
with several highly desirable characteristics for automated agents: it encourages truth 
telling, and results in a choice that exhibits maximal social utility. We have addressed 
several fundamental implementation problems that arise when considering the employ- 
ment of the mechanism in practical real-world systems. These problems included the 
generation of alternatives, the assessment of alternatives’ worth, power and influence 
among the participating agents, and formation of coalitions. Another major issue that 
was treated was the potential desire of agents to keep their preferences private, as far 
as possible. While the original mechanism requires revealing full preferences, we devel- 
oped a method that maintains agent privacy, while preserving other positive attributes 
of the CTm. 
We introduced a novel voting procedure that enables a group of agents to construct 
a joint plan that results in a final state that maximizes social welfare for the group. 
Conflicts among agents are incrementally dealt with; agents iteratively search for a 
final state that maximizes the entire group’s utility, incrementally constructing a plan to 
achieve that state. 
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We also introduced an alternative simultaneous, iterative voting procedure that enables 
agents to reach the decision of highest social utility with only partial information, 
presented the optimal strategy for voting in this procedure, and proved several desirable 
properties of the procedure. We also introduced a sequential version of the voting 
procedure that discouraged coalitions (which remains a general problem with using the 
Clarke tax mechanism). 
Systems comprised of individually motivated automated agents are likely to become 
increasingly common. These agents will need to resolve conflict and reach consensus to 
carry out their tasks effectively. Techniques such as the ones we have explored provide 
powerful tools for this coordination of multiagent activity. Moreover, by approaching the 
question of multiagent environment design formally, we are able to construct alternative 
protocols and precisely characterize their properties. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
We here present proofs of all the theorems and lemmas that appear in the article. 
Proof of Lemma 1. To show that declaring 0” is the dominant strategy, we have to 
show that agent ai’s utility from declaring it is greater than any other declaration df: 
&f(DL&)) - U;(f(D:;‘d;)). 
Expanding the utilities u into worth minus tax, we get: 
Wj(ftDfii.$)) -$(f(D!,;,Uf;)) - wi(f(D$,df)) + t’(f(D!,i,d,k)). 
Expanding the tax t into its components, we get: 
Wi(f(D5i,UF)) - CdT(f(D$)) + 
,jZ i 
-w,(f(D~i,d$)) + Cd,f(f(Dti)) 
,j # i 
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Eliminating equivalent plus and minus terms and adding and subtracting wi( so), we get: 
wi(f(DtivUf)) -wi(SO) +Cdjk(f(oki~~f)) 
.j # i 
- 1 Wi(f(Dtirdf)) -wi(sO) +Cdj(_f(o$vdf:)) . j#i 1 
By of’s definition: 
Ui(f(Dti9d)) + Cd:(f(Dli,“~)) 
j#i 
- ui(f(o$vdf)) +xd:(f(D!,i9df)) . 
j#i 1 
Let ik be the state that maximizes $( sk) + Cj+i d;(s) (i.e., ik = f(D$, u!)), and 
let Rk be the state that maximizes cyZ1 d!(s) (i.e., kk = f(D$, df)). Then (by the 
definition of the choice function f) we get: 
Ui(Zk) + CC2!f(Sk) - Ui(ik) +COY;(k”, . 
j+i j+i I 
By ik’s definition: 
7:’ %(sk) +Cd;(S’) - Ui(ik) +Cd;(““) 20. 
’ [ 
0 
j+i 1 [ j+i 1 
Proof of Theorem 2. The general idea is that each set of aggregated constraints is 
extended by the search process until the “limit of consistency”; therefore, any maximal 
consistent set of aggregated constraints will eventually be reached. But it is the case 
that any state that answers the social welfare criterion is induced by a maximal set of 
consistent constraints. Therefore, the search process will reach sets of constraints that 
induce all social welfare states. 
For simplicity, we assume that the set of individual worth functions is strictly progres- 
sive. The generalization of the proof to &progressive worth functions is straightforward. 
Let s E SW(S) and K be the last step. We need to prove that s E SK (the final set 
of states in step 5 of the algorithm). 
Let G = Z( SO us s) be the set of constraints that induces s, and let 1 = 1 (P(G) ) 
be the length of the plan that results in s. We will prove a stronger claim: for any 
given (imposed) n, the procedure finds all states 2 such that 1 (P( SO -+ 3)) < n and s^ 
answers the social welfare criterion with regard to that additional constraint. 
Let Sl” denote all states that are n-distant (or less) from se. Since, given n, each 
such s^ is in SW(S]“), we have (by the definition of SW for any other state s’ E Sl”, 
s’ f 3) that @( 2) 3 I!.?‘( s’) . Therefore, if 3 is a member of any Ski” it will be 
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a member of SK]“. It is thus sufficient to prove that for some k, s^ belongs to Sk]“. 
Because of step 3(a) in the procedure, it is sufficient to prove (for any given n) that 
s^ is generated at some stage k of the procedure, that is, there exists a stage k at which 
a set of constraints that induces ,T is generated. Or, using the procedure’s notation: 
3k3G’[G” E G” A s E s(G’)]. The proof is by induction on II: 
(I) /i=I: 
(a) 1 = 0, so s^ = SO and c’ = 0. From the procedure it follows that G.? E go, 
and obviously sg t s(0). In effect, since by definition V’iV’sa b f,‘, it is also 
true that G” = S’ = G’ = U, f; and SO E s( G’ ). 
(b) 1 = I ; 3 can be achieved from SO by one operator. Uc( SO) < Ue( s1), so it 
must be the case that .T is preferred to SO by some agents A 2 A (i.e., 
for each member of A, NJ;(?) 3 wi(so) holds). To win higher worth, 
a state must satisfy more constraints of the individual plans (we assume 
progressive worth functions). Let the set of additional constraints be de- 
noted by 14-. It therefore follows that I+ C Ui A Ii. Since SO enables I+ 
(I+ E JOII~)~( so) ), then actually I+ E UiEA 1, !& N( 6’) (this is be- 5 
cause agents want to maximize their own utility, and thus, impose as many 
constraints as they can at each step). Therefore, I’ E G’2 and I+ is the 
required G?. 
(2) Assume that the claim holds for any 1 < II - 1 and that I( P(G)) = a. Let G 
denote all the sets that could proceed G’, i.e., sets of constraints G such that 
[G c G”] A [Gu&,,N.(G) = G”] A [W’(G)) < II - I]. 
For each state s which is induced by the sets in &!, it holds that r/o(s) < Ue( 3). 
It must then be the case that 3 satisfies more constraints than any such s. 
Let 1’(s) denote the set of these additional constraints. From the monotonicity 
of the worth functions with regard to satisfied constraints, it follows that there 
must be at least one state, S, in s(G) (real or virtual) that is a member of 
SW(S1”) (where r = l(P(s~ ---+ 2) ) ). .i is superior to that state since it satisfies 
f+(Z), but the only way for these additional constraints to be satisfied is by 
invoking some operators in S. That is, given the restriction that plans must not 
exceed length r, S is a maximizer of the social welfare. 
On the other hand, since J’ E SW( Sj r ), it follows from the induction assump- 
tion that any such S will be found by the procedure at some step i. Also, since 
.? E SW(Sjr), it does not reduce the social utility of any of its preceding states, 
and thus G is not pruned in the ith step. Let A C d be the group of agents that 
prefer j to S. For each member of A, wi (s^) > wi (S). 
It must, then, be the case (strictly progressive worth functions) that r+(S) C 
UjeAZi. Since j enables f-I-(S) (by definition, ?I E I’(S)1 E fC,,,,lroW(s)), 
r+(s) E UiEA If+‘, and therefore (f+(S) U6) E G’k+’ and 3 E s(C!?UI+(S)). 
The number of steps in our search is bounded by O(max,Esw(st I(P(sa + s))). At any 
step of the procedure, each set of constraints (G) is either being pruned or extended. 
The extension will be by at least one constraint that belongs to follC,,,.(G). Eventually, 
the furthest state of maximal social welfare will be found. Any extensions on the set of 
constraints that induces this state will be pruned at the next step. Therefore, the process 
cannot proceed longer than the number of constraints needed to achieve this state. 0 
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Proof of Lemma 4. To show that declaring ai is the dominant strategy, we have to 
show that the utility of agent ai from declaring it is greater than any other declaration 
d;: 
Expanding the utilities u into worth minus tax, we get: 
Wi(f(Dti*@r)) - t~(f(~:i,~~)> - Wi(f(D:i,dr)) + t'(f(D!Y,i,dl)). 
Expanding the tax t into its components, we get: 
wi(f(DLiToT)) -Cd;(f(D:i)) +Cd,*(f(D!,;,al)) 
j#i j#i 
-Wi(f(DTi,dr)) +Cd:(f(D:i)) -CdJ(f(~L,,di)). 
j#i j#i 
Eliminating equivalent plus and minus terms, we get: 
wi(f(oLi,of)) + CdJ(f(D:i*gI)) 
j+i 
- 
[ 
Wi(f(DLi>dr)) + Cdjr(f(D’,i,d!)) . j#i 1 
By addition and subtraction of OF, we get: 
wi(f(Di;i~~~)) -0: +Cd$(f(DLi,aj)) 
jti 
- Wi(f(D!,ivdr)) -0; +Cd;(f(Dii,d)) * 
j#i 1 
By ai’s definition (ai (s) = Wi( s) - 0: for any s), we get: 
~[(f(DZi~~~)) +Cdj’(f(~Ti~~~)) 
j#i 
-[~:(/(D:i,d:)) +C ;(.f(D’_i*dj)) 
j#i 1 
Let 2’ be the maximizer of a:(s) + Cj+i d;(s) (Y = f(DLi, a:)), and let k be the 
maximizer of Cy=, df (s) (.f? = f( D!$, dr)). Then (by the definition of the choice 
function f) we get: 
af(3”> + cd,‘(S’) - a;($‘> + Cd@) . 
j#i .jZ i I 
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By .P”s definition: 
Proof of Theorem 5. ( I) Assume to the contrary that the voting procedure stops at 
round R, and s* # gR where s* is the choice of the Clarke tax mechanism. It must then 
be the case that there exists at least one i such that W, (s’) - wi ( FR) > df( s*) - df( YR), 
that is w;( s*) - df(~*) > bvi(sR) - df(TR). It must be the case that there is a round 
r 6 R in which the vote uT(ZR) is different than i’s optima1 behavior (above); this 
would contradict i’s behavior as a utility maximizer. 
(2) It is sufficient to consider the extreme cases where all agents’ best alternative is 
s1 (the arbitrary choice), where the vote will end at the first round with no information 
revealed at all, or the case where all prefer the same alternative sk, and the vote 
ends in the second round with sk being the choice (scoring n x 6). Since the gap 
maxYES W;(S) - wi( s?“) of an indifferent agent is (relatively) close to zero, such 
an agent will lose influence after a small number of rounds and will have to opt out, 
revealing his entire set of preferences. The bigger this spread is, the longer the agent can 
participate. (It would require further analysis to show the precise correlation between 
disagreement and information revelation.) 
(3) The stopping condition follows directly from the fact that i’s influence on any 
group choice s* cannot exceed Wi( s*) - w;(sy) - 6 (which is i’s extreme influence 
on the vote) ; it follows from the procedure that at each round (excluding the first and 
last rounds) the score of the winning alternative at that round increases by at least 6 
(as long as the voting process continues). Thus, for any i, the “cost” of changing the 
vote increases by at least 6 at each round. Therefore, in the extreme case, after at most 
(w;( s*) -w~(.s~~“))/L~+I rounds i’s vote for s* reaches We -w~(.Y?) and i must opt 
out. Thus, for any i, the vote cannot last more than ( rnaxsEs [ wi (s) - Wi( syin) ] ) /6 + 1, 
Notice that it is evident from the above argument that the closer the agents are to one 
another’s preferences, the sooner the process will end. q 
Proof of Lemma 3.*’ To show that declaring ui is the dominant strategy, we have to 
show that the utility of agent a; from declaring it is greater than any other declaration 
df’: 
Expanding the utilities ui into worth minus tax, we get 
*’ The lemma was originally proven in ( 3.5 1 using case analysis; the proof here is original 
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wi (f(D+.~vi)) -Zi X fi (f @-+yiu;)) 
-w;(f(D-;,dd;))+Z;xt;(f(D-;+iti;))- 
65 
Expanding the tax ti into its components, we get 
w; (I (D-i. iv;)) -iix~~~~f(D-;))+z;X,,(f(D-;.~~;)) 
-wi (f (D-;y id;)) + Z; X Cdj(f(D+)) -Zi X jzi 
Eliminating equivalent plus and minus terms and adding and subtracting w; (so), we get 
wi (f (D-i, iv;)) - W;(so)+Z;X~dj(f(D~;,~v;)) 
- [w; (f (D-;v$d;)) -w C~ol +z; x gdj (f (D+>id;))] 
By U;‘S definition (for any S, U;(S) = W;(S) - W;( So)): 
u; (f (D-iv iv;)) +z;X gdj (f (D-;siv;)) 
- [ui (f (D-iT id;)) +z; x gdj(f(D-;Tid;))] ' 
By factoring out Z;, we get 
zi X [iv; (f (D-i, iv;)) +gdj (f(D-;q iv;)) 
- [io;(f (D-;vtdy)) +zdj (f(Dl;*id;))]] ' 
Let ? be the maximizer of kU;(s) + Cj+;idj(S) (? = f(D+, ivi)), and let i? be the 
maximizer of $,di( S) + Cjzi d;( s) (& = f (D+, id;)). By the definition of the choice 
function f, we’get 
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By B’s definition (I is not necessarily maximizing over ;vi): 
z, x I [ max 30. 0 s t”i(s) + Cd,(S) - $L!i(k) + Cdj(K) .j#i I i , j#i 11 
Appendix B. Basic concepts of solution for social decision processes 
A common requirement of any decision function is that it should be “optimal” in 
some sense. Different kinds of desirable attributes of decision functions that characterize 
optimality have been suggested in game theory, economics, and voting theory. Typically, 
the attributes are concerned with the influence of an individual agent on the outcome, 
and the impact of the outcome on the individual. Some common criteria include pareto 
optimality, fairness, and individual rationality. 22 In this section we briefly summarize 
the most common criteria. 
In general, the optimality of the decision process may be viewed with respect to two 
main aspects/categories. Below we mention some of the more common criteria that 
have been addressed in the literature [ 45,55,68,84] : 
( I ) Attributes of the resulting decision: 
(a) 
(b) 
(cl 
Global optimality-the chosen alternative should be optimal in some global 
sense. The most common requirement is that the decision will be pareto 
optimal, meaning that it is impossible to change the decision in a way 
that will make some agents better off without making some other agents 
worse off. This same attribute is sometimes called unanimity, to denote that 
if alternative X is preferred over some other alternative Y by all agents 
(unanimously) than Y should not be chosen. Within the “pareto frontier” 
(all the pareto optimal decisions), there are many additional criteria of 
optimality based on social welfare theory. We discuss this issue further in 
Section B.2. 
Condorcet winner-the chosen alternative should beat any other alternative 
in a pairwise contest. There are several weaker versions of this demand, 
such as the condorcet loser criterion (if an alternative Y would lose in 
pairwise contests with every other alternative, Y should not be chosen). The 
generalized condorcet criterion [ 8 l] demands that if the alternatives can 
be partitioned into two sets A and B such that every alternative in A beats 
every alternative in B in a pairwise contest, then the process should not end 
up choosing an alternative from B. Note that the generalization implies both 
of the previous criteria. 
Majority criterion-if the majority of agents have an alternative X as their 
first choice, the decision process should choose X. Another, stronger version 
states that if X is preferred to Y by a majority of agents, then Y should not 
be the ultimate choice of the group. 
22 The issues of solution criteria are discussed in [ 12 1, in the context of combining various default theories. 
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(2) 
(d) Nash’s independence of irrelevant alternatives-if out of a set of alternatives, 
X is chosen, then if any other alternative Y is removed from the set, X will 
still be chosen. In other words, the choice should remain unchanged when 
the group is presented with a subset of the original group that includes 
the original choice. A weaker version (Arrow’s independence of irrelevant 
alternatives) demands that the choice will be independent of any potential 
alternative that is not included in the current set of alternatives (the collective 
preferences over any pair depend only upon individual preferences over that 
pair). 
(e) Monotonicity-if X is to be chosen by the process and one or more agents 
change their preferences in favor of X (without changing the order of 
preferences over the other alternatives), then X should remain the choice. 
Issue monotonicity requires that the utility of the choice that is taken, given 
the entire set of alternatives, will not be lower than the utility of a choice 
that was based on any subset of the entire set. 
Attributes of the process itself: 
(a) Individual rationality-an agent may only gain (utility) by taking part in 
the process (compared to not participating). 
(b) Simplicity-the process should be simple in two respects: the computational 
complexity of determining the choice, and the individual computational 
complexity of determining each agent’s behavior (strategy) in light of the 
rules of the process. 
(c) Stability-the behavior of the participants should converge to an equilibrium 
point, and remain insensitive to minor perturbations of strategy among the 
players (in Section B.3 we describe the main notion of equilibrium from 
game theory). 
(d) Privacy preserving (“information decentralization”) -the behavior of each 
individual should depend on as little information as possible regarding the 
others (preferences and behavior), and the choice function should depend 
on as much of a global view as possible (in contrast to taking into account 
interactions among individual preferences). For example, it is considered 
preferable if one’s behavior can be determined according to others’ aggre- 
gated behavior instead of having to take into account the individual behavior 
of each other member [ 451. 
(e) Decentralization-the degree of distribution affects the likelihood of a bot- 
tleneck, the fragility of the process, and the need for a central decision 
maker. 
(f) Expressiveness-most decision mechanisms consider only the ordinal pref- 
erences of the agents. The magnitude by which some alternative is pre- 
ferred to another cannot be expressed. However, there are mechanisms that 
allow more powerful rating of preferences, such as rating the alternatives by 
points, or the assignment of actual (cardinal) utilities to preferences. The 
more expressive the rating is, the more informed can be the choice that is 
made. 
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(g) Symmetry-given the possible permutations of the agents’ roles in the pro- 
cess, the outcome should remain the same regardless of these permutations. 
The strongest kind of symmetry is anonymity, which says that the process 
answers all possible symmetries (the identity of an agent has absolutely no 
influence on the outcome). 
(h) Neutrality-the name of alternatives does not matter; if we exchange two 
candidates a and b in the ordering of every agent, then the outcome of the 
process should change accordingly. 
B. I. Gerrr,-ai results from social welfare theor:\ 
There is a large body of work in voting theory and social welfare theory that considers 
how groups make decisions when there is no transferable utility (no “money” that 
can be extracted from, or paid to, agents). In social welfare theory there exists the 
distinction between a social welfare function (SWF) and a social choice function (SCF) 
The first assigns a social ordering over the entire set of alternatives based on the 
individual preference profiles, while the second chooses one alternative from the set of 
alternatives. 
In a classic paper, Arrow [ 21 introduced several appealing SWF attributes, and proved 
that they cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In our own case, however, we are interested 
in SCFs. There are many SCFs that reach a pareto optimal decision, but they suffer 
from a major drawback: they are manipulable, which means that an agent can benefit 
by declaring a preference other than his true preference. Thus, a rational agent will tend 
to manipulate the process. 
Therefore, the stability of the choice mechanism is essential in our case. Since we 
assume that agents are rational and self-interested, we are concerned about their mis- 
representing preferences to manipulate group decisions. Unfortunately, a theorem due to 
Gibbard [ 311 and Satterthwaite [76] states that any non-manipulable SCF that ranges 
over more than two alternatives is dictatorial. This means that there is no choice function 
(other than one corresponding strictly to one of the agents’ preferences), that motivates 
all participating agents to reveal their true desires. However, this result pertains only to 
interactions where there is no transferable utility. The Clarke tax mechanism depends 
precisely on such a transfer of utility. 
B.2. Optima&y and social welfare 
Consider the designers of a multiagent environment, who are charged with establishing 
the rules by which agents in an encounter will interact. Once the rules have been 
determined, each builder of each agent is free to design his own machine any way that 
he wants. However, the rules that were established will certainly affect the choices he 
makes in building his own agent. 
Under many circumstances, the designers of multiagent environments will be able 
to formalize some notion of global utility, and want agents’ activity to maximize that 
global utility. While this point of view may not be universally accepted (for example, 
designers may be unable to come to agreement about any definition of global utility) it 
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provides a useful starting point for our design considerations. Therefore, in this research 
we are interested in consensus states that maximize the welfare of the entire society. 
However, there are many ways to measure global utility, and it is not obvious how 
environment designers will decide on one or another. Considerations other than pure 
utility values (such as income and fairness) might need to be taken into account. For 
example, it might be desirable in some scenarios to look for a state that maximizes 
the median of the utilities or some weighted sum of these utilities, or, following an 
egalitarian approach we might want to maximize the minimal utility (max mini ui) or 
minimize the differences in utility gain (minmaxi,j IUi - ujl). 
One simple common approach (due to Nash [65,66]) is to choose the outcome that 
maximizes the product of the individual utilities ( ni Ui). This approach guarantees a 
relatively fair distribution of the mutually earned utility, but narrows the space of feasible 
consensus states. It also assumes a positive utility gain for each participating agent. A 
negotiation protocol for autonomous agents that follows this approach may be found 
in [71]. 
In our approach, on the contrary, all agents share the cost of achieving the consensus 
state, and thus may indeed have negative utility. For these agents, the rationale for 
participation is to possibly reduce their loss. Taking a global perspective on the agents’ 
activity also ignores the issue of individual fairness (Section 5.6 discusses this problem). 
In this research we therefore follow the pure utilitarian approach, and prefer consensus 
states that maximize the sum of the individual agents’ utilities minus the cost of the final 
state’s achievement. In contrast to the approach that maximizes the product, we would 
rather have, for example, a state that gives two agents a utility of 0 and 11 respectively, 
over a state that gives each of them a utility of 1. We would also prefer a state that 
gives a total utility of 11 and costs 1 to achieve, to a state with total utility of 22 and a 
cost of 13. A further discussion of this approach may be found in [ 441. 
Assuming that each agent assigns a worth to each alternative (see Section 3.1)) we 
define the following criteria for global maximization of utility: 
l Given a set of worth functions {wi}, of the agents in the decision group, we 
define the social welfare/utility of each state to be the summation of its worths 
for all members of the society, minus the cost of achieving the state from so; 
U(s) = -C( SO * s) + CT=, wi( s). If we were to normalize the worth functions 
of each agent such that V’iwi( so) = 0, we could define the normalized global utility 
of a state ( Uc( s) ) to be the sum of the normalized worth functions. 
l We say that a voting procedure satisfies the social welfare criterion if it ends up 
choosing a non-empty set of states SW(S) C S such that Vs[ s E SW(S) + 
U(s) > maxkES U(k) ] (i.e., SW(S) contains the states with maximal social util- 
ity). Notice that since these states are “maximal”, they are also pareto optimal (no 
one can benefit without someone else losing; if this were not true, the state could 
not be maximal). 
B.3. Game-theoretic concepts of solution 
The general kind of interaction that we consider here may be viewed as a game. 
Each agent i chooses a strategy si (within a computer, of course, the strategy is simply 
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the program controlling the computer’s choices). The strategy tells it which action 
(declaration of preferences in our case) to choose at each instant of the interaction. 
The combination of strategies played by the entire group (S = (si, s-i) ) determines the 
outcome of the interaction, and in particular determines the resulting payoff for each 
agent ( V, ) . 
Game theory has addressed many interactions similar to the one considered here. Such 
interactions have been analyzed so as to determine what an agent’s chosen strategies 
would be, given the rules of the interaction. Our aim is complementary; it is to design 
rules that would induce the agents to adopt some specific strategy that we consider 
to be desirable (similar in spirit to nzechanism design or the so-called implementation 
problem, in game theory [ 4,271). 
All possible developments of the interaction may be represented by a game tree. Each 
node represents a decision choice of some player; each different choice is represented 
by a different branch. Given the history of the interaction, an agent might not be able 
to distinguish, among a set of possible nodes, which one is the actual node. This set is 
called the information set at that particular point. Each path on the tree describes one 
possible interaction. The end nodes of the tree describe each agent’s resulting payoff 
from that path. 
To be motivated to adopt a particular strategy, a rational selfish agent should be 
convinced that that strategy is superior in some sense to his other alternative strategies. 
The most common solution in game theory derives cooperation as the best response to 
the other agents’ cooperative behavior: 
Definition B.l. The strategy combination s * is a Nash equilibrium if no agent has an 
incentive to deviate from his strategy given that the other agents do not deviate. Formally 
Vi. Vi(S:,SE;) >, STi(Si,Sfi)3 tiSf. 
This concept of solution was used for example (within the distributed artificial intel- 
ligence literature) in [ 711. Although this concept of equilibrium is satisfying in many 
cases, it suffers several drawbacks. First, it embeds the implicit assumption that each 
agent can monitor and verify that the other indeed cooperated. Such an assumption 
is especially problematic when a society of computationally bounded artificial agents 
is being considered. Second, in general there might be multiple equilibrium points for 
the same game, and it thus might be difficult to have the group of users converge to a 
specific equilibrium point. 23 Third, the desirability of a strategy is considered only from 
a player’s viewpoint at the beginning of the interaction (not taking into consideration 
all possible paths of the game), causing the equilibrium point to be sensitive to the 
dynamics of the interaction. 
A much stronger concept of solution (the second one in the hierarchy of solutions) 
derives the desired strategy (cooperation in our case) to be the unique equilibrium along 
any development (path) of the interaction. 
*j On the other hand, a single equilibrium point among equivalent ones can be specified and agreed upon 
ahead of time by agent designers. This allows engineers to have machines that converge to a solution. 
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Definition B.2. A subgame is a game consisting of an information set which is a 
singleton in every player’s information partition, that node’s successors, and the payoffs 
at the associated end nodes, such that all information sets that include any of that node’s 
successors, does not include a node which is not one its successor nodes. 
A strategy combination is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if (a) it is a Nash 
equilibrium for the entire game; and (b) its relevant action rules are a Nash equilibrium 
for any subgame. 
This approach was taken, for example, in [ 1,521. However, the strongest concept of 
solution within the hierarchy is to motivate the agent to follow the desirable behavior 
regardless of the others. Such motivation would be achieved if that strategy would be 
proven to be (under the rules of encounter) the best one given any strategy of the other 
agents. 
Definition B.3. The strategy ST is a dominant strategy if it is an agent’s strictly best 
response to any strategies that the other players might pick, in the sense that whatever 
strategies they pick, his payoff is highest with SF. Formally rii( ST, s-i) > 7rii( si, S-i), 
VJsiVSI f Si*. 
A dominant strategy equilibrium is a strategy combination of each player’s dominant 
strategy. 
Thus, in our scenario, the most attractive solution would be to have some particular 
behavior with certain desirable properties as each agent’s dominant strategy. Having a 
mechanism that induces an equilibrium point which is the result of a dominant strategy 
is very desirable, because it simplifies the reasoning required of an agent. The fact that 
there is no importance to the other agents’ behavior does away with the need to reason 
about the other agents’ strategies, knowledge, or even computational capabilities. The 
behavior of an agent depends solely on its own characteristics (in economics [ 451 this 
attribute is known as “informational decentralization”). Thus, in comparison to other 
approaches, the individual complexity of decision making is reduced significantly. This 
concept of solution was used in [ 18-201. In this article we have focused on the design 
of rules of encounter that induce a solution in dominant strategy equilibrium. 
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